


February 1951

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COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal



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
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
COVER: 25th Infantry Division artilleryman at the sight of a 155mm. howitzer in Korea. (Department of Defense photo.)

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YOU AND YOUR ARMY

As U. S. Regulars Have Always Fought

... Throughout the entire period of this heroic action, officers and men distinguished themselves by conspicuous gallantry and courage. Service troops fought side by side with riflemen. Supply and medical personnel performed their missions despite enemy infiltration and flank penetrations. Engineers fought as infantry and stopped hostile assaults with mines and demolitions. Artillerymen fought off attackers to keep their guns in action, in fact every man in the division was engaged in battle ...

THESE magnificent lines from the Unit Citation awarded the 24th Infantry Division tell in simple, moving language what occurred on a battlefield where uncommon valor was common. When, on a day that cannot now be seen, the guns are silenced and the 24th Infantry Division marches back into garrison it can cherish the knowledge that when it was forced to stand alone, symbolic of the fighting determination of 150 million Americans, it wrote new history in the mountains and valleys of far-off Korea.

And the whole Army of the United States can be proud, too. The Army can be proud that its Regulars—whether three-year enlistees, Reserve officers who volunteered for extended active duty, or the true professionals: the officers and noncommissioned officers who want no other life than Army life—all fought and died as U. S. Regulars have always fought.

We would also call attention to the splendid tribute to the combined arms that make up a division. It wasn't an infantry action with the supporting arms and services filling their normal roles. Note the words of the citation: *service troops fought*

side by side with riflemen ... engineers fought as infantry ... artillerymen fought off attackers. ...

There is a lesson in these words for the Army now in training. It is this: to survive against the enemies that now face us every soldier, sailor and airman, must be individually prepared to fight the battle of survival with the weapons of the foot soldier.

How Many Kinds of Infantry?

ONE OF our editors, reading a manuscript in which the author stated that "armored infantry and standard infantry are different," let his mind wander from the manuscript to think of how many kinds of infantry there are. These occurred to him:

Infantry (also called "standard," "walking" and "regular.")

Armored infantry
Airborne infantry
Marine infantry
Amphibious infantry
Light infantry
Motorized infantry
Mountain infantry

He was pretty sure he hadn't exhausted the possibilities so he made his list into a form of a memorandum and kicked it around the staff. He got these additions:

Poor Bloody Infantry
Mounted Rifles
U. S. Sharpshooters
Zouaves
Pioneer infantry
Line of Communication infantry regiments
Fortress infantry (German)
Parachute infantry
Glider infantry
Rangers

You can see the work of the historical member of the staff in the first five names in this second list. The man who put down the parachute and

glider brands noted that they were World War II designations, now consolidated as airborne infantry. Another observed that the Marines would probably insist that Marine infantry and amphibious infantry were the same thing.

We doubt if the staff has exhausted the field. And so we will be looking for additions from you.

Informal Report on Your Journal

LAST month's issue completed the first half year of your new Association and this magazine. Six months isn't a very long time in the life of institutions such as the Association of the United States Army and **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**, as the history of its two predecessors testify. But we think most of you must have a pretty good idea by this time of what your Association is trying to do through the magazine and we take it that on the whole you approve of what is being done. We haven't heard otherwise.

But as a highly informal report of the staff to the readership (and not be confused with the reports of the Secretary-General Manager to the President and Executive Council) we offer these comments.

Some of you, still loyal to the old magazine refuse so far as you can to recognize the new one. For example, one faithful member sent in his renewal addressed to one of the old magazines and writing, "No matter what you call yourself you are still the _____ Journal to me and always will be. Good luck!"

Our name is sometimes confused. The most common mistake is to call it the "Armed Forces Journal" but we got one letter addressed to the "Combined Forces Journal" and there have been other rather weird derivations. One rather minor problem didn't materialize. Association of the

The Poplars

The brown thrush with a red cherry
In her mouth, warm sheen of sunlight
In her plumage; the slender dark catbird
In the lilac bush, on her nest, looking down
As I dine, through clear glass of my tall window;
The wide round black eyes of a robin fledgling;
And the green mist of poplars over my house-
top . . .
Take these with you to war.

Crackle of dry coconut leaves
In my lane of fire, indistinct gray
Murk; tense to meet it; take the
Locking-ring of the grenade in two left
Fingers, ready to twist out the safety.
Reassure yourself by caressing the grenade;
Run your right fingers along the grooves;
Gloat sensually with your grip over
The streamlined steel . . . Only a scuttling
Land-crab has scared you!

Poplars, misty benisons, bowing
Over the picture of my home; poplars
I last saw with glossy brown leaves
In autumn; poplars with light young leaves
I could not see this spring; Lombardy
Poplars lighted like great candles
With the summer moon through them—
And I can remember your soft
Hand in my right hand, hand for grenades . . .
Take these with you to war.

Crack of a twig man-high twenty yards off
At the edge of the clearing macheded

Out before sundown; shall you snap
The spark in the bomb, and throw
Before the slim lurker drops the mortar shell
Perpendicular down your slit trench?
Wait; trust yourself; you can always
Tell when it's a Nip; be sure; don't
Mark your hiding-hole in the darkness!
You are safe with weapons and friends:
Grenade in your hand, rifle touching
Your wrist, your poignard for
Hand-to-hand weapon play—wait—
Only a sleep-walking parrot snapped a twig.

Sunlight tinting brown plumage,
Highlight on red cherry in the mouth of a thrush;
Catbird in her nest on a lilac bush, looking
Down through limpid glass; round black eyes of a
Curious young robin; and in summer,
Long wind before rains, the poplars
Bow in the breeze, lustrous dark-green
Women's heads; then the leaves turning,
Light touch of silver on the undersides . . .

I took you with me to war; I was two men:
The soldier on guard, with outwardly
Automatic click of the senses; inwardly
Only a lover of you and your world.
Thus I watched in the perimeter dark,
And kept my head, and did not give
Away my position, and wakened
The next watcher: silent squeeze of the
Shoulder; and slept with my poplars
Of home bending over my head.

HARGIS WESTERFIELD.

From *Words Into Steel*. By Hargis Westerfield. \$2.75. Copyright 1949
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U.S. Army is a rather long name and some of us were afraid that correspondents writing the association would shorten it to "U.S. Army Association" or just "U.S. Army" and the letters would end up, god-knows-where in the Pentagon. Maybe they have but we haven't heard of it.

We think that we as a staff ought here and now to make a bow to the members of the Executive Council whose only recompense for a lot of hard work and time on Association business is to get their names in small type on the contents page. To set up the new association and get it going required a number of meetings of the officers and council and every member from Generals Haislip and McLain down have cheerfully expended energy and time in your behalf. They deserve a vote of thanks of the whole membership. Do we hear a second?

We have found considerable curiosity about us on the part of prospective advertisers and our advertising representatives tell us that the curiosity is not only healthy but pointed and that we can expect appreciable results before long. Several factors work to our advantage. We are not a new magazine except in name. We don't have a "captive" audience in the sense that officers of the Infantry and Artillery are "required" to be members of the Association. We do our best to turn out an attractive publication in which an advertiser can be proud to have his name appear.

One unexpected problem has come up in connection with the advertising program. Some of the prospective advertisers want to know more about our readers than we know ourselves. During the years when we did not accept advertising there was no reason

for us to make reader surveys or even to know at all precisely how many of the subscribers to, let's say *Infantry Journal*, were Infantrymen and how many belonged to other arms or services, or how many were members of the civilian components or just civilians. We may have to start keeping those kind of records and if we do you may receive a questionnaire. That kind of thing is quite common among commercial publications and advertisers expect almost every possible breakdown of circulation to be made available to them.

In last month's issue we mentioned that we were going to turn the editorial slant of the magazine towards more practical stuff for units in training including combat stuff from Korea. This issue shows a few steps in that direction. Including more "Battle Facts" by Captain John Flynn,

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

there is the piece on the integration of the ROK soldiers into the 7th Division, and the "Infiltratics" article by Colonel Badger for artillerymen.

Since the merger, the flow of manuscripts offered for publication has become increasingly larger and the handling of these is imposing quite a burden on the staff, especially the editor who has the final responsibility. We have been trying to work out a system that would permit us to give our contributors faster action on their manuscripts and we are pretty sure that it is going to work out. We are delighted with the heavy flow because it gives us more stuff to pick and choose from. But it also entails more work.

You may be interested to know that every manuscript is read by five persons before it reaches the editor and these five are expected to comment freely and openly. The comments are written on the face of a large envelope in which each manuscript we receive is put and, frankly, more often than not, they are not good reading for the proud authors. One of our editors who was an enlisted man on the staff of the *Infantry Journal* during the war recalls some pointed comments he made about the "sophomoric, immature ramblings" of a would-be contributor who wore eagles. By sheer mischance that colonel dropped in on the editor one day and picked up the envelope containing his manuscript. He read the acid remarks but what he said the editor has never divulged. Our man shuddered for weeks in fear that he might suddenly be transferred to the colonel's command. (The colonel turned out to be one of the fightingest regimental commanders in the Army and our man now says that he thinks it would have been a privilege to have served in his outfit.)

Our circulation has been holding its own and even rising a little, although we have been doing a very small amount of direct efforts to build it up. We are now working on several projects designed to increase our readership and you may be hearing of them soon. If you do we'd appreciate an additional plug from you. We have tried many different kinds of circulation drives in the past but the most effective (as we know from experience) is the enthusiasm and energy of our members. When you talk up an article you like in this issue you may interest a prospective reader. When you tell your

fellow officers who are not readers that they are missing something by not being members you are giving us a bigger plug than we would get if we bought five minutes of time from the National Broadcasting Company. Back before World War II *Infantry Journal* used to keep score on the efforts of its most loyal readers and the all-out champion was Brigadier General Milton A. Hill who brought in more than 1,100 member-subscribers by actual count. General Hill, now retired, was General MacArthur's inspector general at the time of Pearl Harbor and later served in the same capacity for General Eisenhower in North Africa.

A Rare Lesson Writ Plain

AS THE old year died away voices of despair and appeasement were heard in the land and a public figure was quoted as saying that he no longer had confidence in the military leadership of the United States.

But in Korea, where American soldiers were girding for the hardest battle yet, there was no despair, no appeasement, no lack of confidence in the generals.

The difference was so marked that historians can put it down that during Christmas week of 1950 the Regular Army of the United States (and its sister services) had, by standing firm in the face of adversity, stiffened the sagging moral and spiritual fibers of a nation which had hardly begun to fight.

For those who can learn there is a rare lesson here, writ plain: only discipline can conquer fear and confusion. And in times of national peril free men, if they wish to remain free, must discipline themselves.

The Epic of Hungnam

THE evacuation of the Hungnam Beachhead was called an epic by the newspapers and we certainly will go along with that. It is no small feat to evacuate 105,000 troops, 91,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles and 350,000 tons of materiel in twelve days from a beachhead under assault by 100,000 enemy. The evacuation has been compared with Dunkirk, which, of course, is all wrong because the evacuation of the X Corps was by no means

a hurried flight of remnants of an army but the army itself, intact and in good spirits.

Army and Navy commanders on the scene agree that the beachhead could have been held if it had been desirable. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle who commanded the evacuation fleet said "It would have been tough but we could have got away with it."

This suggests that a comparison of the Hungnam Beachhead to the Anzio-Nettuno Beachhead in Italy would be more accurate than the comparison to Dunkirk. Anzio was tough but to use the Admiral's words "we got away with it." As long as the possibility existed that the rest of the Fifth Army could eventually link up with the VI Corps on Anzio the arguments in favor of evacuating the beachhead were less persuasive than the ones in favor of retaining it. So it was held and the link up came four months after the original landing.

The difference at Hungnam was that the surprise entrance of the Chinese Red Army into the war precluded any possibility that the Eighth Army could fight over the mountains and join the X Corps at Hungnam, or if they could that it would have solved the problems facing General MacArthur, General Walker and General Almond.

The epic of Hungnam consists of many stories. There was the fortitude of the soldiers and marines who, denying that they were retreating, fought their way backwards from the Manchurian border. There was the skillful operations of the, previously untired 3d Infantry Division in setting up the defensive perimeter around Hungnam and defending it against repeated attacks. (The comparison of Hungnam with Anzio becomes stronger when you recall that this division was one of the stalwart units in General Truscott's VI Corps at Anzio.)

The Navy's contribution was also of epic proportions. Its fire power—from the huge shells of the *Missouri* to the rocket-fire of small ships and the strikes of carrier-based aircraft—helped the 3d Division immeasurably in its task of holding ten times its number of enemy at bay. The evacuation itself was epic. The thousands of refugees who jammed the beachhead had to be fed and screened for removal. Undisciplined and afraid, these refugees packed the ships allotted to them and in some cases

jammed aboard in such numbers that the ships would all but sink under the weight of human cargo. The handling of such people is extremely difficult, totally unlike the orderly embarkation of disciplined troop units and that the Navy was able to do it at all is a tribute to its resourcefulness.

The Air Force comes in for a fair share of the glory, too. Perhaps its greatest contribution came a little earlier when it evacuated 4,690 wounded soldiers and marines from the battlefields near the Chosin Reservoir. Air Force C-47s landed on a make-shift air strip hacked out of a field near a tiny Korean village and evacuated wounded and injured soldiers and marines while under small-arms fire of the enemy. In two days more than one thousand men were evacuated by air. Meanwhile the troops on the ground were being resupplied by the same planes plus air drops by C-119 Flying Boxcars.

The strip had finally to be given up but another was built farther down the same valley. To reach it the troops had to cross a portion of the dam and the Air Force air-dropped a complete bridge of eight spans. Each

span was a two-ton load for a Flying Boxcar. A *New York Times* reporter on the scene reported that a lieutenant told an Air Force colonel, taking off with the last load to leave the strip, "Colonel, I'll kiss the whole Air Force in Macy's window at any time you say."

In the American language that is an epic statement.

Ready on the Firing Line! Fire at Will!

IN the October 1950 issue of the *Infantry School Quarterly*, Captain John R. Flynn begged for less stereotyped marksmanship training courses and argued that many man-hours of training are "misused and abused" when we over-stress preliminary marksmanship and known-distance range firing.

He is the same Captain Flynn who writes the combat notes from Korea which appear on page 14 of this issue. Pretty obviously Captain Flynn's combat experiences have made him a more firm adherent of the need for what he calls "realism" in weapons training. We don't want to disillusion Captain Flynn but we doubt if his article in the *Quarterly* or his account of his combat observations is going to change many minds. The feeling that every soldier in the American Army ought to be a crackerjack marksman is deeply imbedded in the mores and traditions of the Army and even such diverse and conclusive tests as the battlefields of World War II didn't make much of an impact. The traditionalists are usually shocked at the mere mention of the idea and talk about the superiority of "quality" over "mass" as though the only mark of the superlative infantryman is his ability to drill small round holes in an enemy's head or chest at certain fixed distances.

(Continued on page 33)

National Emergency Causes Suspension of Elections

In view of the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman, the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, at its regular quarterly meeting on 18 December 1950, voted to suspend the elections of officers and members of the Executive Council.

Authority for this action is contained in Section 4, Article IV of the By-Laws, which reads:

ARTICLE IV. ELECTIONS

Section 4. Suspension of Elections. During time of war, or during a national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States or by Congress, the Executive Council may suspend elections, and fill all vacancies and/or extend existing terms of office as the exigencies of the service may require. Such suspension shall in no event extend beyond the regular December meeting of the Executive Council following the time of termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President of the United States or by the Congress.

The resolution passed by the Executive Council follows:

Resolved, That pursuant to Section 4, Article IV of the By-Laws, and in view of the President's Proclamation of 16 December 1950, declaring a national emergency, elections to fill vacancies occurring among the officers of the Association and the members of the Executive Council are hereby suspended.

This means that the Executive Council will fill its vacancies by appointment as they occur, in the same way as was done by the Infantry Association throughout World War II.

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THE NEW MAN

Lieutenant Roger W. Little

To help the new man get the feel of your outfit is an important part of the job of your troop leaders

EVERY soldier has had at least one experience of being the new man in an outfit. He can remember the strange and lonely feeling that overwhelmed him when he discovered himself in a new group with his old friends far away. The unfamiliar men around him were to be his buddies, but they talked about things he knew nothing about. He forgot the bad things about his old outfit and wished that he was back with it again. And probably no one helped him as he gradually "felt" his way into the outfit. This might even have been in combat when there wasn't even time to learn his platoon leader's name.

More fortunate was the man whose company commander talked to him briefly—asked him where he was from and how long he had been in the Army. Told him what kind of a company he had joined and why he could be proud to be in it. Then the captain took him over to the platoon leader, and he showed the same interest and saw that the new man in his new squad seemed to understand what it was like to be a "new man," helped him to find his way around. When the first day was over he was already feeling that he really belonged to his new outfit.

To gain this comfortable and secure feeling, a man has to become a part of the "social system" of his group. This system includes the ways men act toward one another, and how they feel about the things around them. It is built up over a long period of time as one result

of the many experiences the group goes through and learns things from. It is one of the strongest weapons of any outfit because it helps them to work together and know in advance what the other men in the outfit will do. This intricate system of distinctive ways of thinking and behaving is well-known to the men who have been in the group for a while. But it forms a tough problem for new men joining the outfit. They have to learn how the group works before they can function with it.

One of the most important activities that the social system of an outfit carries on is that of constructing a "status system." This is an informal conception of how the men in the outfit stand in relation to one another, and it supplements the organization shown in the chart on the orderly room wall or the table of organization. Each individual's place or "status" is determined by what the others think he is like—by what he has done, how well he performs when the group needs him, and what they think he would do in a tight situation or other particular conditions.

The status system of the group does not always correspond to rank. But a good leader is usually one whose men would put him at the top of their informal status system. The members of the group don't use any scientific "tests," but the way they classify men—on the basis of seeing them day and night under all kinds of conditions—is often more accurate than any known test would be.

It is important for an outfit to have the chance to size up its members for in combat they must be sure of what their buddies are able to do. A mistake in judgment by one man may well mean the failure of the section or platoon.

THE NEW man has to go through this process of being "placed," or of being given a "status" in the system of relationships already there when he joins the group.

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He must learn the group's own ways of doing things, and gradually pick up their attitudes and ideas about the people and things in and around the group. The new man has to fit into the new group and the group has to fit the new man in.

The man has left one outfit where he knew where he stood. There he knew who could be depended upon and who couldn't. He knew how to act under particular conditions. He knew what he could or couldn't do and yet stay friendly with the other men. He had seen other fellows come into the group and had helped evaluate them and place them in the status system. Now he faces a new group himself, and he knows they are watching him. They talk about persons and places strange to him. They do things in a different way, a way he can't understand yet because he wasn't around when that particular way of doing things worked out successfully for the group. He must somehow fit himself into the position that the group decides he is best fitted for.

THE NEW group makes adjustments too. They must make a place for their new member. They have their own ideas about what kind of men they want or don't want, even though they have never made a list of good or bad characteristics. Through casual questioning they will find out where the man is from: If he is from the same town or even the same state as someone else, that makes him a neighbor and it is a start toward friendship.

But they will continue to watch him closely to see whether he is a beaver or a shirker, an apple-polisher or a good guy. They want a man who will be loyal to his outfit and who will keep most of his friendships within their group to insure his loyalty. If he doesn't measure up, life will be uncomfortable for him; the group will unite against him. When this happens he usually tries to change and do things the "right way." If he doesn't change, he will never quite make the grade in the outfit. He will always stay an outsider, never able to work effectively as a part of the group.

But usually the new man is accepted by his new outfit. They find he can add something to the group. He begins to think like them and speak their language. He makes his friends in the outfit. He does his share of the work and objects to slackers. He also recognizes the beaver and the apple-polisher, and knows that there is a limit to the amount of exertion expected of him. He passes through his classification successfully and finds a place in the social system. And he knows again where he stands, feels that he has been accepted as a member. He knows what to expect from his buddies, and that they, too, depend on him. In combat, he won't let them

down. He won't let them change their opinion of him by failing in the place they have trusted him with.

The importance of this process by which an individual becomes a member of a closely united little group, within which he has security and status, is clearly seen in combat psychiatric casualties. A man can stand almost any amount of stress until his relationship to the group is in some way lost or destroyed. This can happen through some act or failure of his own. But most often it happens when he goes to a new unit, or when his own outfit changes beyond recognition because of the turnover of men. However it happens, he feels that he has lost his place. He no longer has the comforting confidence of knowing how his buddies will perform. The security of knowing where he "stands" in the system of attitudes and mutual understandings binding the unit together—is gone. Frequently, he becomes a casualty before he even finds that place again, usually because no one has thought to take the time to help him through the process—because his leaders haven't realized or haven't remembered what it is like to be a "new man."

Helping the new man find his place in the outfit, thus speeding up the time it takes for him to become an effective part of his group, is just good leadership. It doesn't mean that the man must be handled with kid gloves or treated like a baby. You don't have to know much about psychology or psychiatry to do it. The idea is right in the philosophy of leadership, built on centuries of human experience.

It *does* mean that we should use what we know about human nature, that we should realize that the process of fitting into a new outfit is seldom an easy experience for anyone. But it's a natural process, and the easier it is made for the man to become a functioning part of his group, the sooner he will be able to contribute his full share to all its activities. It makes good tactical sense because it conserves manpower and strengthens the capacity of the individual to fight and work effectively.

THERE are some methods that everybody concerned with new men in an outfit can keep in mind. They work. Good leaders have always used them.

First, all personnel officers can remember that every transfer makes a new man for at least one group. Too often they think of the soldier's fighting strength and ability as something that is wrapped up in his MOS, rather than something that was in the group where he learned to live and fight. They must think of the adjustment process as a painful and expensive period during which the soldier's effectiveness is limited. Repeated transfers may completely destroy a man's will to do a good job just as too many changes can ruin the morale

of a unit. A social system, constantly disrupted by changing personnel, will be unable to develop common ways of understanding and behaving. It will lose its strength of helping individuals to work together effectively. Members of the group, sensing the lack of any organization in their behavior, or in any conception of where they stand in relation to one another, will have nothing to rely on. When any outfit reaches this state of affairs it can hardly be called a group.

PERSONNEL officers have a lot to do with the way replacements are handled, too. Careful plans to safeguard the soldier's relationship to an existing group such as the "packet plan" in our present replacement system, often break down at lower echelons. It is useless to send a packet of four individuals from the training center, only to have it broken down at the battalion command post and each man sent into combat with a different unit. The packet must *fight* as a group. Unless the men go into combat together in the very same squad, the whole purpose of the plan is defeated. This may cause "disturbing" overstrengths in squads, but this should never be thought of as overhead. It is simply the rather small cost of safeguarding the integrity of the new group, of sending a man into combat with the fellows he had already had a chance to learn to live and work with. It greatly reduces the risk that the individual replacement will not find his place in the group in time, and will become a psychiatric casualty for lack of the feeling of security he needs.

When the new man reaches his outfit, particularly his company or battery, all his leaders must recognize his intense need to be accepted, to learn where he "stands" as quickly as possible, to learn what is expected of him so that he can perform in the desired way. Good leaders are always aware of how new men look to them for criticism and encouragement. The understanding company and battery commander and platoon or section leader will at once learn the man's name and such other distinctive things about him as his home town, his interests, and even his worries. They can tell him about the outfit, how it differs from other outfits and why he can be proud to belong to it.

They will see that he meets the other leaders and men of his group as soon as possible. They will watch him in the field and speak to him frequently during this difficult period of adjustment, recognizing that he probably has a strong feeling of loneliness whether it is apparent or not. They will remember that if combat losses break up a man's squad or platoon, the way he feels about his *company* may be his last defense against mental breakdown. And once the new man is settled and


accepted by the group which may happen rapidly, he is entitled to "full membership." From then on he should never be pointed out subsequently as "one of the new men." Leaders should stop asking him how he is getting along and consider him as an "old" rather than a "new" soldier.

Most important of all, the men in the outfit can help. They can talk to the new man about things that are familiar to him: his home, his old outfit. They can point out their ways of doing things, and how they happened to develop that particular slant. When the new man makes a mistake, which he may often do, they can show him that they understand how hard it is to get used to a new outfit. They will remember that what this man has to offer may be just what they will need when the critical moment of combat arrives. Only when they make it easy for the new man to find his place will they learn just how much they can depend on him, how well he can perform.

FINALLY, the new man himself can help. He can remember that the first few days or weeks are the toughest. He is not expected to know everything immediately, but everybody does expect him to learn as fast as he can. Thinking about how nice things were at home or in the old outfit doesn't help as much as showing interest in the way things are done in his new organization. Knowing that all the other fellows have been through the same thing makes it easier. The rough jobs he gets, the looks of scorn when he makes a mistake, the endless stream of corrections are all part of his initiation. But he'll be a better man if he passes, and he will be respected as a member of his outfit.

The new man will find his place much sooner if he can keep thinking: "These unfamiliar men really want to know what kind of stuff I'm made of. If I show them that I can perform the way they want me to they'll soon take me in as a buddy. I'll probably find that they are a lot like my old outfit. I'll learn to depend on others just as I did before. Then when combat comes I'll always have someone around whom I can depend on. I will never be fighting alone."

When leaders, staff officers, the old men of the outfit, and the new man himself—when they all remember these things, they can count on having a man who will fight for them, who will do his best to be a credit to his outfit. Occasionally they will be let down; some men won't make the grade. But those who do make it—by far the majority—will know that they have a place in the new outfit. They will be able to fight as part of a team much sooner than if everyone expects the new man to make an automatic adjustment to his new outfit.



The Chinese Communist soldier, whether a regular or occasional guerrilla, is an instrument understood and used to the utmost by the commanders of the Chinese Communist Army.

ALTHOUGH the Chinese Communist government is comparatively new, its army has operated as a military fighting entity for the past twenty-three years. Of this period, over nineteen have consisted of a series of individual battles for bare existence, defensive non-positional fighting against, in most cases, superior numbers, equipment and fire power. It is only natural that the Red military minds of China should develop a mobile "unorthodox" theory of fighting, resulting in a complex form of guerrilla warfare well worth serious study by the student of military tactics.

Guerrilla warfare requires three things: a vastness of land and fighting

THE CHINA AND GUERRILLA

area; a backward nation, made up of essentially rural underdeveloped country; and finally, inadequate communications and transportation facilities.

China fits this formula more exactly than any other you might name; not even excepting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. China is a land with more than ninety per cent of its area and population classified as rural. It has tremendous space and woefully inadequate communications system. Given these conditions guerrilla warfare would be inevitable in China.

The present leader of the Chinese Communist Government, Mao Tse-tung, is also the founder of the Chinese Red Army. The Red Army commander, Chu Teh, joined Mao a short

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COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader and founder of the Chinese Red Army, and the present commander of that army, General Chu Teh.

CHINESE RED ARMY GUERRILLA WARFARE

GENE Z. HANRAHAN

Like an iceberg, the Chinese Communist Army has its greater part hidden from view; operating as a hit-and-run force

time later and has since been in joint control of the Chinese Red forces. Although Mao's military theory developed indigenously, with little foreign influence, Chu Teh is a product of the German military schools. He later, however, turned to the Soviets, whose interests he believed more closely coincided with the existing problems of China.

During the long, protracted period of defensive fighting, both Mao and Chu were drawn more closely to the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare. With the advent of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Red armies developed their guerrilla troops

until they reached a high state of military perfection.

In this article I will describe the ideas of the Chinese Red military tactician, and his doctrine of active guerrilla warfare—along with some of the counter measures instituted by the opposing forces who came into contact with this mode of fighting.

TO the Chinese Red general, guerrilla warfare consists of three phases. This factor remains constant regardless of the size and scope of the operation. The first phase consists of intelligence, followed by movement, and finally by action.

Intelligence for these guerrilla units consists in a knowledge of the enemy, his movements, supplies and potentialities. Where the organized army makes use of various professional intelligence services, the guerrilla units utilize the peasants and farmers within their particular area of operations. These civilians are organized into a highly developed spy network. Their knowledge of troop concentrations and movements are, with amazing speed, forwarded by mouth to the guerrilla unit commander. This phase also consists of definite overt action by small, individual guerrilla elements which are constantly at work—feigning, harassing outlying elements and cutting means of communication and transportation.

In the second phase the guerrilla unit commander must show unusual ability and daring. His element must execute a series of movements in respect to obtaining a temporary position for an all-out attack or ambush of the enemy forces. The advantage here is maintained by superior knowledge of both the enemy and the terrain, supplemented by the mobility of the unit. Each individual soldier carries only what is absolutely necessary for the individual operation and is hence able to move with surprising

speed over the most rugged of terrain. The Chinese Red Army tacticians feel that in their movement phase, the tactical maneuvering that is executed parallels in importance the actual fighting. In his book, *Strategic Problems*, published in 1941, Mao Tse-tung has said, "Our strategy is one against ten, while our tactics can be formulated as consisting of ten against one."

In the final phase the battle is the payoff. However, annihilation and defeat of the enemy is secondary in the individual campaign to the capture of spoils. The unit commander must remember that he is not fighting a war of attrition.

In defensive fighting, one can draw no clean line of demarcation between the guerrilla forces and the larger armies. Both are equally dependent on each other and closely associated with each other. The Chinese Communists make a clear distinction between their terminology of a "guerrilla force" and a group of "individual, armed and organized peasants." An army breakdown of troops would be as follows: (1) regular troops and fighting units; (2) guerrilla forces; (3) armed and organized peasants.

Under satisfactory conditions, the guerrilla forces are integrated as a member of the larger army element. The size of each particular unit is determined by the area covered and the strength of the enemy forces in that specific area. The guerrilla units are commanded by regular army officers who are specifically trained in guerrilla techniques. They organize and run all units on the same basis as that of the regular army. All military operations, whenever possible, are operated under command of higher echelons.¹

DURING the Sino-Japanese War, the two large fighting forces of the Chinese Red Army consisted of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. The Eighth Route covered an area of approximately four provinces in North China with an estimated population of some thirty million Chinese. The actual organi-

zation of the army could be compared to that of an iceberg. The regular personnel of the army directly opposing the Japanese on an established front amounted to approximately a hundred and thirty thousand men. The guerrilla elements of this army, operating behind the Japanese lines, supplemented by armed peasants, consisted of five hundred thousand men.

The New Fourth Army area was spread over three provinces in Central China. In 1941 the estimated strength of this unit, in regular troops, was a hundred and fifty thousand, which in turn was supplemented by a corresponding number of guerrilla units and armed peasants.

Of primary importance is the location of their bases, movements and fighting, all of which were conducted within the Japanese invasion and occupation areas. The statement of Chen-yi, the commander of the New Fourth Army, in regard to his army's operations, conducted wholly behind the Japanese lines, illustrates this point: "Our policy of transferring the invader's rear into fronts and thus reducing the scope of the Japanese occupation to mere points and lines in this region, has achieved great success."

A large army such as the Eighth Route could be termed as mainly a central dispersing and strategy center, facilitating and training smaller units, and maintaining guerrilla zones. The central army headquarters exerted control over all lesser units. The effectiveness of this control varied with the distance, size and loyalty in the respective groups.

The controlling echelons of the army attempted to develop land areas into self-sustaining and fighting entities, which later could assume semi-independent control over the particular fighting units within their command.

All guerrilla operation zones were broken down into guerrilla bases and guerrilla areas—the essential difference being in the amount of control exerted by the guerrilla forces within their given zone. Those zones which were only under temporary control by the guerrilla units were termed areas; those which were maintained in a permanent status, were called guerrilla bases. In most cases, guerrilla bases were maintained in mountainous zones. Guerrilla areas included plains and embraced rivers, lakes and harbors. The first mission of the commander of an individual guerrilla base was the extension of his

control to plains and the development of the areas into guerrilla bases. Mao Tse-tung realized the difficult task of turning a guerrilla area into a base, and saw that two important tasks had to be completed before this could be accomplished. These tasks were the annihilation of the enemy and the awakening of the masses both in morale and physical support of the guerrilla elements.

THE guerrilla base is the most highly developed and complex form of organization for guerrilla warfare. In the overall plan, the base forms the actual rear for the guerrilla forces, and is indispensable for the existence and development of this form of warfare. The Eighth Route Army broke its major control area down into eleven large semiself-sustaining bases known as "Anti-Japanese Bases." From these bases military, political and civil officers engaged in one or another phase of guerrilla activity. The military spread out and took charge of independent guerrilla units in the area. They trained new troops and attempted to keep contact, as close as possible, with the higher army echelons. The political officers operated in much the same way as in the Soviet Army. They also worked in conjunction with the civil officers supervising and teaching the peasants and farmers sabotage techniques, along with Marxist dogma.

Most of the fighting from these bases and areas consisted of individual small-scale operations. However, these guerrilla engagements developed into intensive battles, and caused the Japanese high command a great deal of trouble. In August 1940, one of these engagements, known as the "Hundred Regiments Battle," consisted of a correlated force of 500,000 men, along with the assistance of a 150,000 armed peasants. They smashed the communications and transportation lines throughout North China. This combined operation, estimated by some to be one of the widest guerrilla actions in history, succeeded in disrupting Japanese civilian and military personnel, blowing up seventy-six bridges, destroying two hundred miles of railroad track, 500 miles of highway, nineteen railway stations, eight tunnels, and sixty-seven concrete forts, along with the capture and destruction of large amounts of Japanese weapons and equipment.

It is obvious that the Japanese command realized the disastrous conse-

¹We should note that this situation existed only under ideal conditions. Because of the great distance and lack of communications during the Sino-Japanese War, many of these individual units, which had been cut off from the main army for a length of time, degenerated into bandits. The Red Army leaders instituted measures to counteract this by placing political officers with the elements of more dubious loyalty in an attempt to weed out the potential undesirable bandits.

quences of these extensive guerrilla operations. The Japanese strategy in guerrilla-dominated areas consisted in advancing along railroad lines and capturing strategic points. Their positions were consolidated by pushing forward a network of forts and blockade lines, each a self-sustaining unit, protecting a vital communications or supply area. This however, did not restrict the guerrillas, and they were forced to facilitate this method by adopting semi-guerrilla tactics themselves. They learned to dispatch small, highly mobile elements to offset the guerrilla forces, and at the same time balance their positional elements. They were still under the handicap of lacking adequate knowledge of the movements and headquarters of the enemy and of the terrain.

The Japanese realized the value of the villagers and farmers to the guerrilla units. They knew that the peasants and villagers besides forming a perfect intelligence network, performed other helpful duties for the guerrillas. They cared for the wounded, supplied food and clothing to the soldiers, and served as a means of warning and communication for the individual units. The young men of the villages and farms, when properly indoctrinated into the Communist camp by the civil and political officers, served willingly as soldiers either in the regular Eighth Route Army or in a guerrilla base unit. The Japanese technique of dealing with the villagers and peasants wavered from attempts at wooing them into the Japanese camp by propaganda, to slaughtering wholesale villages of men, women and children as an example to the anti-Japanese elements. Neither produced any effective results.²

The extent of the guerrilla activities in North and Central China became so grave that in 1940, of the thirty-six Japanese divisions in China, eighteen were placed in the north to curtail the activities of the Eighth Route Army, and in Central China, the area of the New Fourth Army, the Japanese high command placed four divisions, four independent brigades, and two hundred thousand puppet troops. These puppet troops, most of whom were forced or coerced into fighting for the Japanese, were of little value in actual combat.

Following the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, followed essentially the same strategy as that of the Japanese. The Kuomintang forces, of which there were some twenty divisions wholly or partially equipped by the United States, held the centers and rail points. Here, as in the same case during the Sino-Japanese War, the Red forces held the countryside. Again the theory of extension into guerrilla-dominated areas by operating on lines and points. Had not the Nationalist forces been so corrupted both in morale and fighting efficiency, their development of tactics against the Red guerrilla activity would have been interesting to follow.³

SOME observers have reported a high correlation between the tactics of the Soviet partisans and those of the Chinese Red guerrillas. Although the Soviets studied the Chinese guerrilla tactics, one can observe some essential differences. The Soviet armies as a whole made little use of their regular troops for actual guerrilla operations. The partisan troops of the USSR would more closely parallel the "armed and organized peasants" of the Chinese Red forces.

The Soviets also made use of extensive forests and swamps to hide and retreat in. In Central and North China there are no swamps and few trees. The guerrillas in this area must rely more on distance, rapid movement and rugged terrain.

The German troops developed a different mode of operations against the Soviet partisan forces. They attempted to surround the enemy partisan units, with an ever diminishing circle consisting of several echelons of troops. The Japanese attempted this early in the war, but failed to realize any satisfactory results.

It is axiomatic that guerrilla warfare is a defensive arm of war and has little use in any offensive operation. It can, however, be used as a means of paving the way for a force that is in the process of changing over from the defensive to the offensive. The

³This writer does not wish to take any political sides or assume any definite arguments that led to the defeat of the armies of Chiang Kai-shek. However, it appears evident that the morale of the Nationalist forces fell to such an extent that a majority of their unit casualties in the latter period of the civil war consisted of desertions. Direct sales of weapons and equipment by the Nationalist military forces to the Red Army are reported, even while they were in preparation for battle with these enemy elements.

Chinese Red Army when attacking, as in the last years of the civil war, had little use for guerrilla operations on a large scale.

In his text, *On a Prolonged War*, Mao Tse-tung stresses that the Chinese Reds must keep in mind the necessity of casting aside guerrilla defensive war for offensive large-scale mobile war whenever possible. In the area, taken as a whole, the large-scale mobile war is of primary importance. It is only in breaking down the whole into individual component parts, that guerrilla warfare can be utilized effectively.

There appears to have been some obvious fear on the part of Mao that his Red forces, so long on the defensive, would be reluctant to leave their guerrilla warfare technique when engaged in the offensive. The fact that he somewhat overestimated this, however, can be seen in the rapid advance made by the main Chinese Red armies through Central China in pursuit of the retreating Nationalist forces.

At the present time, the need for active guerrilla warfare on the part of the Chinese Reds is almost nonexistent. However, we can logically assume that in the advent of any enemy invasion in force, or a serious defeat of their armies in the field, would be followed by a reversion to their old-time proven guerrilla tactics.

An invasion or occupying force must be prepared to cope with guerrilla activities that would equal or better those in existence during the Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese peasant and farmer, even though he is not a Communist, would side with his own people and government, whatever its kind, against the non-Chinese invader armies. The term *wai kuo jen* (foreigner), still carries as much distrust and suspicion as of old, for the average Chinese.

It would be tantamount to defeat if the occupying and attacking forces in China did not take direct action to counteract guerrilla activities in their areas. The necessary steps to be taken in meeting this situation are too broad and detailed to be handled in this study; however, they deserve consideration both on the strategic as well as the tactical level.

I have only scratched the surface of the problem of guerrilla warfare in underdeveloped areas as pursued by a determined organized military power. I hope others will continue the investigation of this problem in the light of more recent military techniques.

²For a time, the Japanese made small, intermediate villages directly responsible for railroad tracks and roads in their area, which were not personally guarded by Japanese troops or forts.

BATTLE FACTS

FOR YOUR OUTFIT

Combat Tips From Korea

CAPTAIN JOHN R. FLYNN

These facts for the combat soldier come straight from the cauldron of battle in Korea. Here are hints for junior leaders now training men to fight.

The paragraphs that follow are not necessarily original with me but are common to all combat commanders in Korea. I hope they will serve to refresh company grade officers who get troop duty and are valuable to the officers now engaged in training our growing Army.

Command

THE company commander in combat must use his officers and noncoms to the fullest possible extent. The use of mission-type orders will accomplish this because they require your subordinates to exercise initiative and knowledge. Work your officers hard but be constructive when you criticize them.

Watch your men and be ready to put a man who doesn't fit the job he is doing into another slot. Actually every soldier should be trained as a

CAPTAIN JOHN R. FLYNN, Infantry, commands Company K, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division.

rifleman first and his career job should come second. But we haven't done it that way and it has been costly to us in Korea. Certainly we need clerks, wiremen, drivers, cooks and paper shufflers galore. But we need riflemen more. So let every man in the Army be a rifleman by trade and a specialist when the fight doesn't need him.

Weapons Training

BATTLES are controlled and won by the few men who dominate the field with the fire of their weapons. We, in Korea, know that now. One way to insure that more and more of our men join the ranks of the shooters is to make our weapons training more realistic. Marching fire drills and battle courses make a soldier aggressive and teach him to seize the initiative. Long tedious hours of dry and range firing do the opposite. We need more small unit problems that combine rifle fire with the supporting fires of our mortars, machine guns and recoilless rifles. And we should use ball ammunition, too.

Our postwar training program failed to prepare our men for combat. We need aggressive, purposeful training methods that bring out a man's will to win.


Infiltration

INFILTRATION is a favorite tactic of the North Koreans and there's no reason to think that the Red Army doesn't favor it highly too. [German reports tell of whole units of Russians infiltrating a position during the night.—Editor.]

In Korea we learned to form a perimeter defense against infiltration. Usually platoons organized their own perimeters but sometimes they joined together to make a company perimeter. It all depended upon the mission, terrain and other factors. Just use common sense in selecting the nature and extent of your defensive arrangement and you'll come out all right.

In establishing your perimeter locate all probable points of infiltration and prepare fire plans to cover them. Teach your men to wait until the enemy gets within seventy-five yards—or even twenty-five, depending upon terrain and the kind of fire lanes you have—before opening fire.

FEBRUARY, 1951



When you do open fire, fire with everything you have. Sporadic, scattered fire might drive the infiltrators off but heavy fire will cost them dearly and there will be fewer infiltrators the next time.

Infiltrating North Koreans hit a platoon of Company K, 7th Cavalry on two successive nights early in September. The platoon was dug in on defense between two hills occupied by two other battalions of the regiment.

In the two nights the platoon killed 180 enemy soldiers and wounded an unknown number. Six men in the platoon were wounded. The platoon showed commendable resourcefulness in stripping the enemy dead of grenades, arms and ammunition which it used against the enemy in succeeding assaults.

When attacked by infiltrating bands hold your position at all costs. Isolate the bands and destroy them

with heavy weapons and artillery fire. An infiltrating group has no recourse to resupply of ammunition, food and water unless he can break through your forward position. Remember that he is aiming at your supply points.

To overcome the psychological advantage infiltrators possess, we should train our soldiers to expect night action and to be able to fight effectively at night.

Physical Conditioning and Battle Fatigue

CLOSE-order drill and road marches won't make a unit hardy enough to attack up hills and mountains. We did it in Korea but at a tremendous cost and succeeded only because a few men were tough enough spiritually and physically to make the attack stick.

What we need in training is more cross-country work and a return to the obstacle courses. The physical part of the training program must be as rigorous as it is possible to make it.

We had our usual cases of battle fatigue or combat exhaustion. When I spotted a man who needed a rest I would have him spend some time helping around the company supply point or even send him back to the kitchen train for a shower, shave and hot food. This saved some men, some of them excellent noncoms, from completely breaking down.

Company officers can reduce the number of fatigue cases by following such a "preventive" method as this. We told our key men that we did not acknowledge "battle fatigue" cases and any man who returned to the rear had to check through the company CP. Any other approach would have been disastrous because every man in a rifle company from the commander down thinks at one time or another that he has had about all he can take. You can't admit that there is such a thing as combat fatigue during the period of actual operations.

We stopped self-inflicted wounds by announcing that all noncoms who wounded themselves would be reduced on ground of misconduct or inefficiency and that others would be dealt with firmly. We also issued an order prohibiting rounds in the chamber of small arms except when the man was engaged in a patrol or attacking.

INFILTACTICS

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Badger

For protection from infiltration artillery must be massed within a perimeter, organized defensively by determined men

ARTILLERY UNIT LOSES GUNS TO INFILTRATORS

NEWs reports and headlines such as this one have caused questions by artillerymen who are intent on keeping artillery tactics abreast of the ever changing methods of war. Did the techniques and principles of artillery tactics we taught actually prepare artillerymen for their jobs in the Korean conflict? Was the action in Korea so different from the action in World War II as to make worthless the many lessons learned then through bitter experience? Have the lessons to be learned from our World War II experiences been correctly evaluated and are the most important points stressed?

Although the answers to these questions will have to wait for more complete combat reports, it is reasonable to assume that new techniques will be developed as a result of the Korean action.

Unofficial reports state that the

principles presently taught are sound and workable. Since this is true it may be well to review some of the lessons learned from those experiences with World War II infiltrators, as well as the information thus far received from Korea.

There are two concepts which conflict with each other. For maximum protection against enemy air activity and counterbattery fire, all guns and units of a battalion should be well dispersed. The greater the dispersion, the better the protection. On the other hand, for protection of an area against infiltration a minimum of dispersion is desirable. It is impossible to have as much dispersion as we would like for protection against enemy air and counterbattery and at the same time have a compact perimeter for maximum protection against infiltrators.

To derive any benefit from lessons learned as a result of combat experience, it must be evaluated in the light of prevailing conditions such as the type of enemy, his tactics, his weapons and capabilities, the experience and weapons of our own troops, and the terrain. Any security plan must be a compromise arrived at logically, realizing that we cannot have the same degree of protection for every contingency. No set of experiences can be followed blindly; they must be related to a particular condition. If the enemy is using infiltrators to any extent he probably will not have air superiority because if he did he would use air power to neutralize our artillery. So it is a relatively safe assumption to minimize anti-aircraft defense in any security scheme designed to combat infiltration.

It is not my purpose here to list

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS J. BADGER, Artillery, served with the 25th Infantry Division from its organization until April 1946. He went from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in the 64th Field Artillery Battalion, ending up as its commander for the last eighteen months he was with it. He then served as G-4 of the division for six months in the occupation in Japan. He spent three years with the Historical Division, Department of the Army, and graduated from the Command and General Staff College last year. He is an instructor in the Department of Combined Arms at The Artillery School, Fort Sill.

all of the desirable characteristics of an artillery position. However, until we have flashless and smokeless artillery powder, and the enemy discontinues use of high-velocity, small-caliber guns, defilade will remain of prime importance. The principles of cover and concealment also apply to any position. If the enemy can't see us, or find us, he can't infiltrate us.

Terrain limitations may leave no choice as to the area we will occupy, but if we do have a choice, the size of our perimeter should be one of our first considerations. Plain arithmetic presents a strong argument for a small, compact area and a short perimeter. The larger the area, the more outposts, which means less sleep for more men and the fewer men for other duties. Conversely, the smaller the area, the fewer outposts, which

means more rest for more men, and more men for regular duties. If the batteries of a battalion become spread so far that they are not mutually supporting, the result will be individual battery perimeters which can never have the strength of a single coordinated battalion defense.

Reports from Korea indicate that battalion perimeters are being reduced at least fifty per cent by two simple methods. First, all trucks not needed for immediate effective fire are placed in a rear echelon. Prime movers are kept in emplacements within a hundred yards of their howitzers. Second, all except thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition in the gun pits is kept mobile. This eliminates

the need for ammo dispersal area within the battalion perimeter.

NOW we should consider the probable objective of the infiltrators.

Their mission may be direct destruction of the artillery pieces or other matériel, disruption of FDC operations, or the killing or wounding of artillerymen within the perimeter. Or, it may be just to obtain observation from which artillery and mortar fire can be adjusted into the perimeter. Experience and knowledge of the enemy's habits will give us valuable clues as to which type of infiltration to expect.

However, just as we would not be

A concentrated six-gun battery of howitzers is dug in alongside a railroad in Korea. There appears to be little cover or protection from air, counter-battery fire or observation.



guilty of attacking each target in the same way every time, an alert and intelligent enemy will vary his infiltration tactics both as to objectives and as to ways of attaining those objectives. One time he may try to destroy the pieces by explosives; the next time he may want only observation. If the enemy has artillery, mortars, and ammunition, observation may be his immediate goal.

Unofficial reports have shown that both types of infiltration have been employed in Korea. One unit has had no infiltrators in the position area, and the only casualties suffered were from counterbattery fire believed to have been adjusted by a nearby observer. Another unit's first three casualties were the S-3, S-2, and another man in FDC, all of whom died from bayonet wounds. A small perimeter is the best defense against actual penetration of the area. Control of all ground observation into the area by actually having it within the perimeter is the ideal; however, the terrain, the distances involved, and men available for such duty usually make this impossible.

To counteract this deficiency, observation posts may be occupied outside the perimeter during the day and then pulled in at night or, in some situations, combination listening and observation posts can be established outside the perimeter both day and night. These posts must be manned by alert sentries who understand that they leave their posts only on orders. A sufficient number of men must be present at each post to enable others to rest. Communication should be by wire as soon as possible, with at least one alternate system available to give warnings.

Each post should be organized for all-around protection. This includes digging in, overhead cover, and a complete encirclement of barbed wire with attached noise-makers, flares and booby traps. Mines and concertina wire also should be placed across or along likely avenues of approach. Quantities of grenades should be furnished all posts whether a part of the perimeter or outside of the perimeter.

WE must remember that all commanding terrain left unoccupied will be occupied by the enemy. If it is impracticable to outpost all the dominant terrain there are additional precautions necessary to protect the

smaller perimeter. Morning and evening patrols should be sent out along the little-used trails, creek beds or any other suspected enemy approach. In jungle this distance may be less than three hundred yards but in open country it should be considerably more.

Patrolling is highly desirable even if infiltration is only a remote possibility. It is absolutely essential if infiltrators have been within the perimeter recently or if the perimeter is particularly cramped or vulnerable.

Infiltrators will use every trick possible. On the bodies of Japanese infiltrators in World War II were found sketches showing exactly how they got into the area, the location of pieces, and how they were to withdraw. It was evident that they had remained concealed several days while they studied the position. Often their routes were over cliffs and mountains considered impassable at night.

Patrolling, if not permitted to become perfunctory, keeps these infiltrators insecure and ineffective. Frequently artillerymen have insufficient training in patrolling. Artillerymen must be qualified in this respect even if it means borrowing capable instructors from the supported infantry until the unit is confident of its own ability.

A very handy weapon which an S-4 with only normal ingenuity will be able to provide is a 81mm mortar with a large supply of illuminating shells. Positions for these weapons should be organized and prearranged data available to permit prompt and effective illumination on call from any sentry. The only advantage an infiltrator has is surprise and that he cannot be seen; if these are taken away, every advantage is with the defender.

Just as with outposts, a perimeter should be completely encircled with barbed wire as soon as possible. Noise-makers, flares and booby traps should be attached to the wire. Creek-beds, trails, and draws should be covered by additional concertina, anti-personnel mines and booby traps. Indiscriminate use of mines is likely to cause more injury to our troops than to the enemy; therefore, a careful record must be kept of their location. All perimeter posts should be inside the barbed wire, dug in, sandbagged, overhead cover provided for protection against grenades and demolitions, and equipped with some type of automatic weapon. Again it may

be necessary for the S-4 to use his ingenuity to procure additional caliber .30 machine guns.

MANY combat reports received from Korea have stressed the value of AA weapons in ground defense. Since the Reds have lacked air power AA weapons have been concentrated on their ground defense mission. Eight twin 40s and eight quad .50s, which is the normal AA attachment to a direct-support artillery battalion, more than doubles the effective fire power available to an artillery battalion for ground defense. These weapons must be coordinated and integrated into the perimeter defense. Late reports have shown them invaluable for this mission.

Every day spent in a position makes the position more vulnerable to infiltration. With hostile underground informers operating it has been found necessary to always have completely organized an alternate position. These positions are dug in by bulldozers and the battalion will prefer to move at least once every forty-eight hours. If terrain is not available for such moves, the only solution to offset this is the daily improvement of the position by additional fortification, more barbed wire, mines and more and better camouflage.

Even though an enemy can locate the position on a map, if he cannot tell where the key installations, outposts, or the traces of the perimeter lie, his job is made more difficult. Demolitions, grenades, mortars and small arms are the weapons of infiltrators, and field fortifications can give protection against these.

Sentries should be posted at all times at each piece and outside the FDC. Wire should be laid to all sentries; warnings, reports, and orders should be given as quietly as possible over this means. Emergency and secondary warning systems must be provided.

Whenever any action occurs within the perimeter the senior officer should immediately take charge. His orders by phone or presence in person will immediately restore confidence to the men; particularly those who are inexperienced. He must remain available if possible where he can direct and control the actions of the entire perimeter. Keeping any action localized or confined to a certain area is absolutely vital. Indiscriminate firing, noise, and conflicting orders may

easily cause more damage than the enemy. A minimum number of clearly defined paths should be staked out for night traffic.

Security of the position begins as soon as the first man enters.

NORMALLY the battalion executive coordinates the defense of the entire battalion area. Each battery must have a security officer who is responsible to the battery commander for its security. The security plan must be known by everyone. Each sentry must know the sector assigned his post and the sector assigned the adjacent post. Fires must be mutually supporting and overlapping. Range cards, with distances to critical terrain features, are desirable. With machine guns it is advisable to construct H-frames marking right and left limits which will prevent the machine gun, particularly at night, from traversing out of its sector.

Several batteries in Korea have had to fight infiltrators in strengths of from two hundred to five hundred. To do this, the howitzers must be able to assist by direct fire, preferably by simply shifting trail. If all avenues of approach cannot be covered by shifting trail, then secondary positions, still within the main position area, must be assigned and prepared.

In addition to slit trenches at the howitzer positions, gun crewmen must have foxholes from which they can assist as individuals in defense of the battalion area. Alerts must be practiced so that each man knows his position and mission in the close defense of the area.

Artillerymen must fight it out in protection of their positions. There is no safety in flight.

SECURITY must be coordinated with every unit in the perimeter. Don't count on infantry or other supported troops for help in outpostting your area. If infantry is available, use them to the maximum advantage; but troops not under your command may leave without notice. Regardless, make sure that you have a plan to put into effect that uses only your own troops.

Information from Korea indicates that it has been necessary to place artillery well forward (within three thousand yards of the front lines) so that the artillery area may be close to the infantry reserves. But more



Forward observers of an artillery outfit in Korea radio back the position of a North Korean target.

important, having it well forward enables the infantry to make counter-attack plans to assist the artillery being overrun by infiltrators.

An authentic illustration of the importance of coordination of security occurred on Luzon near Balete Pass. A dozer crew from an engineer outfit pulled into the perimeter just at dusk. They dug foxholes and set up a machine gun just two hundred yards in rear of an artillery outpost. During the night the Japs attempted to infiltrate; the artillery outpost opened fire, and then the engineers started firing. The artillerymen were caught in the fire of the engineer crew. Four dead Japs were found in the morning but there were also two dead and two wounded artillerymen.

The fact that artillery is vulnerable to close-in attacks by a daring and courageous enemy cannot be minimized. But if the position is well organized, the advantages are all with the defender.

The sign of a good unit is a dead enemy for each burst of outpost fire.


THERE is no practice more dangerous than indiscriminate firing within the perimeter, particularly at night. No rounds should be allowed to re-

main in the chamber of a weapon. A commander must punish offenders forcefully and relentlessly.

In the final analysis, regardless of how good the security plan is, its worth will be measured by the fighting qualities of the individual soldier. A confident, calm soldier who understands and knows how to use all his weapons will do well even under a poor security plan, but a fear-filled, indecisive soldier will ruin the best plan and prove dangerous to the entire command.

One outfit in the Pacific was ineffective in its first engagement because of a standing operating procedure with which all were familiar but which stressed the dangers of infiltrators to a fantastic extent. Anyone reading it got the impression the jungle was infested with knife-carrying infiltrators, and the chance of not being knifed during the first night were rather slim. That this outfit later turned in an outstanding record was primarily due to the fact that the men regained confidence in themselves, their sentry buddies, and their weapons.

They proved that an attacking infiltrator, while dangerous, is up against a much tougher proposition than you, the man in the foxhole.



The Rat Race

Colonel F. X. Purcell

ANY resemblance in this article to persons or animals, living or dead, except those in the zoo, or to actual military equipment, is entirely unintentional. THE EDITORS.

ON Sunday you take the kids to the Washington zoo. You pass the sign that says, "Lost children will be taken to the lion house," and turn toward the habitat of the rodents. Inside the round fence you see some of your favorite performers playing their favorite game.

There is a horizontal disc set on a free-wheeling spindle, and the rats hop on and off the disc and keep it spinning by scampering on it. As

COLONEL F. X. PURCELL, JR., Air Force, served in the Corps of Engineers for twenty-one years and then transferred to the Air Force. You may remember him as the author of "How to Serve Under an SOB" which appeared in the September 1950 issue of this magazine.

their little feet run faster and faster and the disc whirs more and more gaily, you marvel at their industry. But they never do get anywhere.

On Monday you go to the Pentagon and wonder why it looks so familiar.

You are Colonel X, charged with seeing that the Air Force gets what it needs to build air bases with. This is a simple agreement, compared with government of occupied areas or the mobilization of industry for war. But let us trace just one item on the agenda of your office; the development of a bulldozer that can be carried in an airplane.

The problem is fairly clear. If you were a smart man you could sit right down and solve it. But for the sake of illustration we'll assume that you're a professional soldier and therefore not very bright. By yourself, you are not able to predict the course of the cold war, analyze the strategic requirements and the logistical capabilities of the Atlantic Pact, or take millions of dollars out of the pockets of

your fellow citizens and convert them into flying bulldozers.

Maybe the bulldozers would be a criminal waste of money. Yet if our national defense should depend upon building air bases quickly in another situation like Korea, the lack of these tools might lose us a war. And if that did happen some day, it would be because you, the responsible officer, had fallen down on the job. You have to get the right answer somehow.

The Pentagon was designed for exactly this situation. It is filled with people who can ask a few intelligent questions and occasionally give an intelligent answer. But, don't get me wrong. The people in the Pentagon are just as smart as the people in the Empire State Building or the Chicago Merchandise Mart, and there is probably no more red tape there than in your local department stores. But the Pentagon runs a multibillion-dollar business. Things have to be coordinated to make sure we don't go off on tangents. You have to ask questions.

THE first question that occurs to you, as an economy-minded servant of the American taxpayer is, "What will it cost to design it?" That sounds like a question for Engineer Research and Development, so you call your friend Ed.

"That depends," he says. "If you want a complete new design, all made of light metals, and maybe a turbine type engine and rubber track it'll cost about half a million dollars."

"Oh. Have you got half a million dollars?"

"No."

Now, you're not very smart, but you can figure out the next question: Who does have half a million dollars?

You wend your way by ring, corridor and ramp to the office of a young major in the fiscal sanctum. Charlie unbends enough to shake your outstretched hand, and you perch on the forward edge of a chair and work up a worried frown.

"I know you don't like to be bothered with small projects like this, but sometimes it takes just a little money to develop a key item whose importance is all out of proportion to its cost."

"Well, pretty soon Army Field Forces is going to come out with a demand for an ultra-light bulldozer to carry in an airplane. When they do, maybe you'd like to be able to say

that you anticipated the need and have funds already earmarked. You understand, of course, the importance of airborne equipment?"

"Oh, yes, of course."

"Now, this development would only cost a few thousand dollars in the first year—say, fifty thousand. The next year it would be a little more; and then in the third year probably the pilot model would come out, so the cost would be greater."

Charlie looks troubled. "That's really an Engineer job, and it really ought to come out of Army Engineer funds."

"You're absolutely right, Charlie. But those fellows haven't got the vision you've got."

"Well, if it's a real emergency I guess we can find fifty thousand dollars. But your bulldozer will have to be established as a firm requirement."

That gives you your next cue. You go to see friend Red in Requirements. "Gee whiz!" he says. "That sounds like something we ought to have! How would you use it?"

"In New Guinea, between Port Moresby and Wewak. We had to put up an air umbrella over Wewak for our attack there, and we had no fighter bases within reach. The only way we could build one was to fly an aviation engineer battalion over the Owen Stanley Range and set them down. If we hadn't, we might not be in Tokyo yet."

"Well, what's the matter with the equipment you used then?"

"Too small. In New Guinea we had good ground and good weather; and all we needed was a fighter strip. We had to do the same sort of thing at Myitkyina, only there we needed an all-weather base for big airplanes. That time we had to take heavy equipment, chop it up, fly it in by pieces, and weld it together again."

"So what you want is something you can carry like the little ones but work like the big ones. Why don't you get it?"

"Money. The Comptroller won't come across unless your office says it's a real requirement."

"Well, I'll sure agree that in that sort of situation you'll need it. But are we going to build air bases like that in the future?"

"I thought you would be able to tell me," you say.

"That's really in Pete's shop, over in Plans."

You should have thought of Plans in the first place; they will probably

have quite a lot to say about it. You go around to see Pete.

He stalks to the "top-secret" file and snatches out a stack of red-bordered papers.

"Some of our short-range plans, like JACKPOT, might. But you don't have the equipment now, and by the time you get it developed, those plans will probably be obsolete. In FIRE-BIRD all our bases will be near railroads or ports, and in LONGBOW we'll fly from existing bases. So it depends a lot on the timing. Then again, there's the question of air transport. How big an airplane will you need, and how many?"

"We would design them," you say, "for the biggest assault aircraft. How many we would need would depend upon the size of the job."

"Well, you see," he butts in, "there's the question again of time. We don't have many of those planes now, and by the time we could get enough of them, we may not want to do that. And even if we had the planes, it would be a matter of priority. There will be lots of other demands—carrying spare parts for maintenance, ferrying troops for the Army. It would have to be decided in each case which operation was the most important."

Things start wheeling around in your brain—bulldozers, airplanes, paratroopers, dollars, priorities—and it seems impossible to pin anything down. Everything depends upon something else. You hear a pattering in your mind, soft little feet running and running and not going anywhere.

"Would you say," you ask, "that there is no need for that type of operation?"

Pete purses his lips judicially. "No, but I'd say that it is a diminishing requirement. It's a question of time."

So you go back to your office and call the Engineers again. "About that airborne bulldozer, Ed, how long do you estimate it would take to get it?"

"The development would take three or four years, including the design, pilot model, service-testing and so forth. To get it into production, maybe a couple of years more. The big question is materials. Why don't you call Paul in Procurement?"

You call Paul. "Suppose we had a design for an aluminum bulldozer about four years from now. How long would it take to get it into quantity production, considering tooling up, getting materials, et cetera?"

"Well, that would depend upon

what priority you could get, and the quantity you wanted. What would be your requirement in—say—tons per year?"

"Let's see. They would weigh eight tons each, and there would be about twenty in a battalion. That's 160 tons. Then if we equipped five battalions each year, that would be 800 tons per year."

"That's quite a chunk of aluminum. You would be competing with the aircraft industry, and of course they are already having trouble with allotments. But in an emergency you would need a lot more, and that's just the time aluminum would be hardest to get. You had better check that priority business."

Priorities—that's high-level stuff.

"Jean," you ask your secretary, "who do we know on the Munitions Board?"

"Whom do we know on the Munitions Board?" she repeats, misquoting you slightly. She gets out the list of committees, and thumbs through it until she finds "Non-ferrous Metals." "Here's Commander McGuire. Didn't you talk to him about six months ago on titanium or something?"

"Right. See if you can get Mac on the phone for me." She does.

"Aluminum?" Mac comments. "It'll always be least when you need it most. You see, it's not just bauxite; there's enough of that for all your mother's pots and tea kettles, and there is clay, which can be used in war when cost doesn't count for so much. And only about half of the aluminum plant in the country is percolating. The two things that are holding up production are insufficient electric power and insufficient consumer demand in peacetime. With magnesium it's the same, only more so."

"Well, how about the allotment of power? Why not allot a larger share to light metals so as to encourage the industry?"

"That's getting into the back yard of the Federal Power Commission; but they won't do much about it unless you can show a burning desire for your bulldozers. Better take it up with Requirements."

So you jump on the rat-race again and patter with your little feet. The disc runs merrily around and around; sometimes you seem to be getting ahead a little, and sometimes you fall back. But the pace is fast and the music of the wheel is gay, and once in a while you do get a piece of cheese, and sometimes a big one.



GETTING OUR ROKS OFF

Lieutenant Ed. E. Balmforth

AT THE outbreak of the Korean War the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division was spread all over Kyushu, most southerly Japanese island, as a security measure for the logistical base that Japan was soon to become. This phase didn't last long, however, and the regiment was alerted to assemble, along with the rest of its division, at Camp Fuji, Japan, on 4 August. It was while the regiment was at the tent city on the lower slopes of Mount Fuji that Republic of Korea soldiers—Roks, as we were to call them—first appeared. Although the 17th Infantry was then in the midst of intensive pre-combat training and the rank and file of the regiment knew full well where they were headed, security with regard to developments in Korea was fairly strict. Most members of the regiment therefore didn't know who the Korean visitors were or where they had come from, and many a GI momentarily believed that the U.S. Army had enlisted some Japanese. Before their identity was established, the newcomers, who were being herd-

The integration of Rok soldiers into the 17th Infantry created a number of problems that hadn't been anticipated. But it was an interesting and instructive experiment that may lead to happier and more productive results.



South Korean instructors use the latest gadgets to instruct their trainees in the techniques of firing the 81mm. mortar.

LIEUTENANT ED E. BALMFORTH, Infantry, was a member of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, when he wrote this article and may still be. During World War II he was an enlisted man in the 78th Division Artillery and on the staff of *Stars and Stripes* in ETO. He was commissioned in 1949.

ed about like cattle, were referred to as "Gooks," instantly substituted, when we learned they were Koreans, for the presumably more respectable Roks.

The addition of a thousand foreigners into an American regiment was made at a time when the staff sections and troop units were extremely busy with intensive training and preparations for a waterborne move and it was accepted calmly and without much comment or trouble.

A scant two weeks before the regiment left the training area for the ships, the Korean troops were released to the companies. We had learned that the Koreans were composed of roughly two groups: a partially trained police group, small in number, and a large group of raw recruits. When the companies received their Roks on the basis of about 110 per unit, company commanders found almost without exception they had received only representatives from the recruit group. A very few spoke any English. Their preliminary training had been extremely cursory. It was obvious that the units had a big job before them in training their Rok recruits. Trained English-speaking Korean officers and men would have been valuable aids if available. What the companies didn't know was that there were Rok officers in regimental headquarters. Also, the small number of trained Korean police had been kept at higher levels than battalion.

UNIT commanders were instructed to integrate the Roks on the man-to-man "buddy system." At first there was no personnel accounting for the Roks but in time the companies were instructed to submit a daily special "Korean Morning Report." This was later amended to require a daily entry in the Record of Events Section of the regular Morning Report, supplemented by a monthly roster.

In addition to normal language difficulties, the language barrier in this case was complicated by the separate and distinct alphabets. Even Roks who could read their own language had great difficulty in even recognizing their names in English letters. Many a harassed platoon sergeant discovered that the way he pronounced Kim Houn Sik didn't mean a thing to any of his twenty-odd Koreans. At other times a resigned Korean would admit to any name the sergeant cared to pick out. As a re-

THE AP REPORTS ON THE "BUDDY SYSTEM"

(Released December 12, 1950)

BY HAL BOYLE

With U.S. Eighth Army, Korea. (AP)—The "buddy system" has been a failure in the opinion of most frontline commanders in Korea.

This attempt to integrate South Korean soldiers with American frontline outfits was begun in August. It was an emergency military measure.

In those desperate days of defense along the Nakdong River line American soldiers were not arriving in enough numbers to replace the men lost or wounded in battle. So it was decided to fill the gaps in the line with selected South Koreans.

This emergency program to put Koreans shoulder to shoulder in the battle line with American troops became known as the buddy system.

To get the needed volunteers some enterprising commanders sent officers into Korean cities and invited picked young native policemen to come out and spend a day with their outfit.

After a big meal of hot American chow and the gift of a few candy bars and packages of cigarettes, many of the special guests quickly decided they preferred this lush life with the U.S. Army to lonely police duty or chasing guerrillas.

The program started off in an atmosphere of one big happy military family. Each recruit was assigned to an American buddy, whose job was to act as his friend and teacher in learning how to be a soldier.

It was a thoroughly good-hearted program, launched with the best of intentions. It was sternly ordered that the Korean volunteers be treated in every way as the complete equals of the American soldiers. They were to be given no more than their fair share of such unwelcome fatigue duties as digging latrines or unloading supplies.

And the program got off to a good start. A Korean who signed up as Kim What Bong quickly was nicknamed "Pete" or "Mike" or "Duck-foot" or "Underslung." He quickly picked up a few stock soldier phrases such as "take it easy."

Everything was palsy walsy—as long as the outfits were refitting in rest areas.

Some units that enthusiastically adopted the buddy system soon were 15 per cent or more Korean in strength.

A few regimental commanders however violently boycotted the whole program by failing to do anything to recruit native volunteers.

When the mixed Korean and American outfit went in to combat the buddy system began to fall apart. Under the stress of battle the differences of language and loyalty between the two nationalities became more vitally important than their desire to understand and work with one another.

The Koreans haven't had time to learn our Army technique. An American doughboy hated to have his life dependent on whether his Oriental buddy knew enough to give him covering at the right moment.

There were numerous cases of outstanding stubborn and heroic fighting by these Korean volunteers. There were other cases where they broke and ran—and these created bitterness.

"They largely have just taken up space," said one veteran commander who had been among the first to welcome the buddy system.


"We have tried to get these Koreans to fight with American equipment and most of them just don't have enough mechanical sense yet.

"To try to integrate them with an American Army is a waste of time. They understand only force and it goes against the grain to use the degree of force they understand. We have too much respect for the individual.

"It is all right to say we should educate them up to our level. That's fine. But you can't do it in war time."

That is a fair summary of how most troop leaders feel about the integration program. And as fast as they could get fresh American replacements they got rid of their Korean volunteers.

The result today is that the buddy system has been quietly shelved.



A 7th Division unit pushes through a village during the advance from the Inchon landing. Some of the men appear to be Roks.

sult, nicknames and the last four digits of service numbers took the place of Korean names. This didn't help the company clerk any, and there are plenty of errors hidden in administrative papers.

THE buddy system worked less well in practice than in theory. It was soon the accepted practice in the 17th to put Koreans in small groups so that they could work together. This seemed to improve their morale and

group spirit. We also discovered that they were less needed in battalion headquarters companies, with their multiplicity of individual specialized jobs, than in the rifle companies, and especially in the heavy weapons companies, where the hand-carrying of weapons, so often necessary in the rugged Korean terrain, made them valuable assistants. As losses from casualties and AWOL developed, most battalions soon consolidated their Roks into the rifle and heavy-weapon companies. AWOL, incidentally, proved to be not too serious. American cigarettes and patriotism was given equal credit for this.

The language difficulty and the impatience of the GI with his Rok buddy were not the only limit to the usefulness of the "buddy system." The typical Oriental disregard of personal hygiene and sanitation was a real and ever-present handicap. On board ship en route to Korea they soon showed they were not house-broken and many a Korean received the treatment usually reserved for the family kitten. But the habit was hard to break.

The Roks were unworried about the purity of drinking water. They drank anything, including water in fragrant paddy irrigation streams. I personally saw them drink water which ran very close to a makeshift platoon latrine.

OPERATIONALLY, the greatest fault with the buddy system proved to be its awkwardness. With squads, platoons, and companies swollen to fifty per cent over-strength, unit commanders found their tactical groups

bulky and difficult to manage. The present T/O of the infantry battalion, based on a nine-man squad, was thrown completely out of kilter. The finely drawn T/O figures for the rifle company were suddenly useless and without meaning. More thought about the best use of the Roks might have cancelled this problem before it became one.

The Roks' lack of respect for our equipment rather surprised us. We threw most of it at them on a hurried, combat-expendable basis. This gave them the impression that the supply was unending. Our own habit of overloading the individual soldier was particularly noticeable in the case of the Koreans, with their lesser physical stature. Of the equipment lost, most of it was thrown away. Harassed platoon sergeants and squad leaders had cause for exasperation. As one put it: "Everything we issue them goes right on their backs. Every one of 'em wears his whole damn form 32!" By the time the 17th Infantry had completed its part in the invasion and the subsequent march down the Korean Peninsula to the ships again for the Wonsan invasion (which proved unnecessary) most GIs were wondering out loud: "When are we going to get our Roks off?" They were thoroughly ready to give up their Koreans buddies.

Yet much of the friction was not the fault of the Koreans. A lot of the confusion was of our own making. There is much that we can do in the future to eliminate the causes of difficulty.

There are many things good to say for the Roks. They are by no means unintelligent. They picked up some

A Rok artillery outfit, dressed in U.S. garb, mans a U.S. 105mm. how.

A GI instructs a couple of Roks in the care and treatment of jeeps.



training — notably drill, weapons work, and other subjects which do not depend upon extensive interchange of information through conversation very quickly. They have a natural knack for camouflage. They camouflage everything, constantly and cleverly, and are far better than our own troops in recognizing the value of camouflage discipline.

IF the Army ever again adopts foreign elements—as it well may—the preliminary orientation and training period should be intensive. Its importance cannot be overemphasized. When the possibility of any such attachments becomes evident, the greatest possible dissemination of language training among our own officers and noncommissioned officers should be stressed. During the initial orientation period a minimum of English, consistent with available time, should also be taught to the indigenous recruits. Each of them should at least know how his name looks in English letters and how to write and speak his own service number in English. This comparatively simple step would eliminate much administrative difficulty.

The publication of native-language field manuals would be of great help. Interpreters and native officers and noncoms should be evenly distributed within regiments in proportion to troop numbers. It is a great temptation to hold back the cream of the crop for the use of higher headquarters, but it should be remembered that the need is also great in the line units.

The adoption of American standards of sanitation and personal hygiene should be enforced from the very outset. Small teams of native soldiers, led when possible by their own leaders, should replace the buddy system. Should we again absorb large numbers of foreign soldiers into company-size units, the T/E of the unit, especially with regard to squad burners, water baks, marmite cans and the like, should be increased to take care of the swollen T/O.

If these things are done, and if a commonsense orientation of our own troops is accomplished beforehand, there is no reason why we cannot again use native troops in direct conjunction with our own effort. It can be done and without the troops itching to get their Roks off.



Rok recruits get an introduction to the 81mm. mortar by way of cleaning the cosmoline from them.



FIND 'EM

FIX THOSE *Principles*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
E. M. POSTLETHWAIT



FIND 'EM



FIX 'EM



FIGHT
'EM

OUR huge and complex training system in World War II did a tremendous job and did it well. But it failed in one important respect. It reproduced soldiers stuffed to the ears with techniques but sadly lacking in knowledge of the principles which govern the use of those techniques. This was true of both enlisted and officer trainees. Our training system taught them how to do many things important to their trade and it taught them what to do in certain *specific* situations. But it wholly failed to teach them what to do, and *why*, in *any* situation. It didn't teach the all-important principles.

A new OCS graduate, given a hypothetical situation which was pretty much down the alley, usually came up with at least a satisfactory solution. But if asked *why* he put his machine gun here, his 1st Squad there, he almost invariably said, "Because that's

the way we were taught in school." And he seldom knew why the school did it that way.

What was wrong? The lieutenant was neither dumb nor stupid. He knew his weapons from muzzle to breech and had mastered many good techniques to use in firing them. He knew a lot about formations, equipment, marching, sanitation and personal hygiene. But he *didn't* know the simple tactical principles of the attack!


Why didn't he?

When you ask this question of officers who served in our wartime training establishment, they answer that we were too busy for principles and had to concentrate on technique. To me that is preposterous. If I had only one hour to train a man before taking him into combat, I would spend the first fifty-five minutes explaining the simple basic tactical principles of the attack and, in the last five minutes, I'd show him how to load and shoot his rifle.

There is nothing new, difficult or mysterious about these principles. Yet there are many soldiers, even Infantry soldiers, or rather, *particularly* of the Infantry, who do not clearly understand them. Perhaps their very simplicity is the key to the trouble.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. M. POSTLETHWAIT, Infantry, was a battalion commander in the 34th Infantry Regiment during World War II. More recently he has been an instructor at Fort Leavenworth.

• Men won't do things well until
they understand what they are doing



Too simple and obvious to those who understand, and unrecognized by those who don't.

The simplicity of these principles is brought out well in words General J. Lawton Collins used to favor, and probably still does: "Find 'em! Fix 'em! Fight 'em! Finish 'em!" And he usually added, "And guarding all the while." These phrases cover all the basic principles of the attack, and, with very little explanation, should clarify the idea for anyone.

Find 'em! It shouldn't take more than a minute to point out to the new soldier the obvious fact that we can't fight an enemy until we know where he is. To "Find 'em" the soldier learns that he must acquire all possible skill in scouting and patrolling, observation, reporting enemy activity, sound-and-flash ranging, photo interpretation—and all the other skills connected with any phase of intelligence.

Fix 'em! Having found the enemy, two things are necessary before the close-in attack can be launched. The enemy must be held in place, and his ability to deliver effective fire must be reduced. These are accomplished by what we frequently call a "base of fire." There is no fixed method nor any particular weapon that we "must" use, or "always" use, to establish a base of fire. (The "must" and "always" are quoted from the spiels of too many of our "tactical" instructors.) The object is to pin the enemy down and prevent him from shooting. Terrain, visibility, range, size and type of enemy force will never be the same in any two situations; therefore weapons must be selected, subject to availability, to fit the job, and a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations is vital. An understanding of the "Fix 'em!" principle furnishes the "why" of technical knowledge and skill with weapons and

their use on the ground.

Fight 'em! This principle is just a little more complicated than the others. It is the guts of the whole thing. It embraces the art of tactical skill. It requires the establishment of a pattern, a combination of several things—a play. It is the method by which the attacker gets his assault force within assaulting distance. A base of fire having been established, the assault force must then move in such manner that (1) the base of fire can continue to function until the very moment the assault is launched, and (2) the force can take maximum advantage of cover and concealment and still arrive at the enemy position in a minimum of time. This is known also as the "fire and maneuver" principle, which means the combined use of a base of fire in conjunction with the movement of an assault force to the objective. This principle furnishes the "why" for many things: ex-

tended-order formations, hand signals, terrain appreciation, map reading, use of the compass, pyrotechnic signals and all techniques pertaining to orderly, rapid and tightly controlled movement on the battlefield.

Finish 'em! This is the payoff—the assault, a version of the principle of mass, the shock action, the closing in and mopping up. The purpose of the assault hardly needs explanation. It is the obvious “why” for the development of technical skill in the use of hand grenades, assault fire, snap shooting and all other techniques of close-in fighting.

In order to complete the explanation, two more things should be emphasized. First, all four principles must be fitted together into a pattern. This is illustrated graphically above, in order to establish the close relationship of the various parts of the picture. All the necessary elements of a good attack plan are present. If any part is missing, disaster is likely. And you must remember to “guard all the while;” proper security to the flanks and rear is a “must.”

IT has taken you only a few minutes to read this explanation of the principles of the attack. If you hadn't thought much about it before, the simplicity of the whole thing may have struck you. Does it not seem reasonable that the same thing could be taught to any man in the Army in a one-hour conference? Does it not seem reasonable that reference to it could be made during orientations and field critiques? If you agree, then you will agree that there is no valid reason why soldiers should arrive at the battlefield with a wide knowledge of techniques and without the vaguest idea of their related use.

Some of you will ask, “How about the Able-Baker-Charlie team idea which was in our manual and which we taught?” That idea was based on these very principles. But, unfortunately, it was taught almost exclusively as a *drill*, and its entire value was lost. That is very possibly the reason why it is not in the new manuals.

Basic tactical principles *can* be taught, and when they are learned the battlefield payoff is invaluable. Here is an example drawn from personal knowledge.

WHEN our outfit arrived in Australia, we felt that we were about as well trained as any outfit could be. If

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anything, we were over-trained from three years of intensive work in all phases of infantry operations. We had been over our techniques so many times that we were sick of them.

But even with all this training we knew something was missing. The officers and noncoms agreed that we were pretty solid on our techniques, but were shaky on the principles of their use.

We arranged a one-hour conference for all officers and noncoms at which these principles were reviewed. We emphasized the fact that techniques were only tools with which to implement principles. This was followed up with a squad field firing problem which gave every squad leader a chance to apply the principles. The results were amazing. The problem involved an attack on a Jap type pillbox. In solving it, nine squad leaders out of every ten, having located the pillbox, established a strong base of fire, the impact of which was directed to the firing slits in the box. They then personally led a maneuver, by a covered route, up to within a few feet of the pillbox where they cut off the fire by prearranged signal, charged in with tommy guns blasting, and had grenades exploding inside the box within seconds from the time the signal was given.

THAT particular piece of training paid off in combat many times in the following months, but the best example of it occurred on Red Beach on Leyte, in the Philippines, on the morning of October 20, 1944.

The first-wave assault platoons of Companies K and I, 34th Infantry, were landed about two hundred yards to the right of their assigned landing zones. The assault platoons of Company K were stopped along the bank

of a tidewater slew running parallel to the beach and about a hundred yards inland by a row of Jap pillboxes.

The commander of Company K came ashore in the second wave, which was landed exactly in the assigned zone. He didn't know that this put him about two hundred yards to the left of his assault platoons. Assuming his 1st and 2d Platoons to be straight ahead, he struck out through the thick underbrush of the coconut grove with his company headquarters group of five or six men (first sergeant, communications sergeant, runners, radio operator, and others). They arrived at the slew and crossed it with no difficulty. They heard the firing to the right, but assumed it to be Company I, and so continued.

After moving inland another hundred yards or so, the company commander decided that something must be cockeyed since he couldn't find no signs of his platoons. He began calling his platoon leaders on the company SCR-536. When they told him what they were doing, he said, “Stand by,” and returned to the slew with his party. He then cautiously advanced along the bank toward the firing, and quickly located the nearest enemy pillbox and then his own company.

He talked to his platoon leaders on the 536 to confirm positions, and then issued a fragmentary order roughly as follows:

“I am on your left flank and across the slew. Company headquarters is with me. That puts us right on the flank of the left pillbox. Got it?”

“OK. Your platoons are the base of fire and we are the maneuvering unit. Put the fire of your entire left squad on the left pillbox, the fire of the next squad on the next pillbox, and so on. When our first grenade goes off in front of the first box, shift the fire of the left squad to the second box instantly because we will follow that grenade pretty close. When we've got that box under control, we'll pitch a grenade in front of the next one and move in. As we move down the line, I want your squads to cross over and finish mopping up behind us. I'm going to wait ten minutes so you can get the word to everybody. I'll keep a man on this radio to answer any questions.”

The plan worked like a charm. Why? Because, although the assignment of tasks was about as unorthodox as possible, everyone understood the basic principles upon which that

plan was based. Six Jap pillboxes were knocked off like tenpins by an assault force consisting of a company headquarters. And without a single casualty.

THE disturbing fact is that our new Infantry manuals on tactics do not explain these principles as a basis for the leader's plan of action. There is nothing wrong with any of the material concerning tactical principles in our manuals, but something more is needed which would clarify the instruction on the attack at any level of command.

If an explanation of the basic elements of an attack plan, and particularly their relation to each other in a complete pattern, were included as a chapter of the appropriate manual, then it could be referred to in the discussion of tactics at each command level and tie the technique to the principle. Further, if this were followed through in field instructions to the troops, the success of our attacks would be increased, and with lower casualties.

Time and again in both European and Pacific theaters, infantry assaulted either without properly coordinated supporting fires, or, what was worse, without any base of fire at all! The fact that no artillery fire or air support was available was no excuse. The infantry regiment has within itself an awe-inspiring arsenal of fire power, a fact quite obvious to anyone who has seen the regimental "mad minute" demonstration at Benning.

WE have tried to cut down infantry battle casualties by putting more and more fire power in the regiment. But fire power is no good when it isn't used. How many times have platoon, company and even battalion commanders howled for artillery fire to support a lagging attack, when they had not even established a base of fire with their own weapons? How many times were the casualties among the riflemen in an assault sinfully high because enemy weapons weren't being held in check by properly planned supporting fires? Infantry casualty lists tell us that the answer is "Far too many!"

It must not happen again. Men won't do things well until they understand what they are doing. We must, therefore, teach the *principles* first.

FEBRUARY, 1951

SOLDIER

The stars swing down the western steep,
And soon the east will burn with day,
And we shall struggle up from sleep
And sling our packs and march away.

In this brief hour before the dawn
Has struck our bivouac with flame
I think of men whose brows have borne
The iron wreath of deadly fame.

I see the fatal phalanx creep,
Like death, across the world and back,
With eyes that only strive to keep
Bucephalus' immortal track.

I see the legion wheel through Gaul,
The sword and flame on hearth and home,
And all the men who had to fall
That Caesar might be first in Rome.

I see the horde of Genghis Khan
Spread outward like the dawn of day
To trample golden Khorassan
And thunder over fair Cathay.

I see the grizzled grenadier,
The dark dragon, the gay hussar,
Whose shoulders bore for many a year
Their little emperor's blazing star.

I see these things, still am I slave
When banners flaunt and bugles blow,
Content to fill a soldier's grave
For reasons I shall never know.

BRIGADIER GENERAL C. T. LANHAM

Reprinted by courtesy of *Harper's Magazine* and the author.

Brigadier General C. T. Lanham was a young lieutenant not long out of West Point when he wrote "Soldier." It first appeared in *Harper's Magazine*. When it was reprinted in *Infantry Journal* in September 1936 the way orders for reprints suitable for framing (\$1 each) rolled in amazed the then editor (Forrest Harding) and the then associate editor (Lanham himself).

In the years that followed an occasional oldtimer would request a copy of the reprint although the supply had long been exhausted. The last such instance that we recall was a personal visit by a lean and bony sergeant of Infantry. His faith in the Infantry Association was badly shaken when the young lady at our reception desk told him she had never heard of such a poem and that the Association didn't deal in reprints. He couldn't imagine anyone connected with the *Infantry Journal* not being able to repeat every line of "Soldier" from memory.

When it was again reprinted in the *Infantry Journal* in 1941, the editorial judgment of the editor in the enduring quality of the verse was sustained. Now with a new war raging and a new Army being built we think it should make its first appearance in *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*.

Miffed at Your Meteor

MAJOR ROBERT EDGREN



What Goes Here . . .

THE dark magic of the Artilleryman's trade is well exemplified by the title of this article and some of our Doughboy editors, who couldn't even fathom the meaning of the title—let alone the rest of it—insisted that our Artillery editor write a paragraph of explanation of what goes here.

Here's his best effort at making everything simple and clear.

The metro message (or in Artillery parlance, the Mif-Mif) is a coded tabulation of meteorological conditions on the surface of the earth and at varying zones above it. The Artillery applies this meteorological information to its firing data to increase the accuracy and effectiveness of its fire. Wind velocity, density of air, and powder temperatures are among the factors which influence the range and deflection of artillery firing. The computation of these data obviously is somewhat complicated and time-consuming. In this article Major Edgren has attempted to provide a workable, pre-fabricated method of handling metros.

IT'S dark . . . unobserved fire missions are coming in on the phone . . . the radio barks a demand for TOT . . . and in comes a new metro message.

Is your first impulse to light your cigar with the metro? Or are you ready—the answers in your shirt pocket, ready to put on the slipsticks in a few moments? Here's a thoroughly practical solution, worked out in combat. It will enable you to handle new metros quickly and efficiently.

This system lets you do your calculating in advance—when time isn't pressing you. A few little cards three inches by four and a half inches will hold the information you need. They fit in your shirt pocket and they'll last as long as the range tables.

At the top of each card you write

MAJOR ROBERT EDGREN, Artillery-USAR, is S-3 of the 829th Field Artillery Battalion and lives at Redondo Beach, California.

the charge, tick mark range, and metro message line number; for example: 105mm howitzers, "Charge 4; 4,000 yards; use line 2."

One card for each frequently used charge will do, except for charges 6 and 7 which have two tick marks.

Now think a little: what temperatures, wind, and densities are likely to occur in the region? You will find that there really are not very many possibilities and that all of them can easily be written on the card. Under "weight of projectile," there are only three possibilities: a table of 51 numbers will cover powder temperatures from 0 degrees to 102 degrees F.; old VE requires only one entry—in yards; air temperature, since changes are very small, can be covered with 11 numbers, rear wind 18, and density 30. You now have in your pocket the answers to anything that may come in the message. Covering the card with waterproof transparent paper

will preserve it from thumbprints and rain.

What are the advantages? Assume a mif message comes in and your information is: wind direction 5500, velocity 18 mph; corrected density 97.4 per cent, corrected air temperature 38 degrees F.; powder temperature 40 degrees F.; shell weight one square; old VE minus 26 foot-seconds; Y-azimuth of fire, 2900.

The proportions of wind affecting deflection and range are needed. There are tabular shortcuts to this—we made a table for any likely wind in mph from various chart directions, which gave the deflection effect directly in mph, as well as the rear wind. This table took a long time to make and probably wasn't worth it, as the page in the range tables is compact and quick. Subtracting fire azimuth 2900 from wind direction 5500 gives us chart direction 2600, which yields L 56 and plus .83 effects,



A page from an
S-3's Notebook

giving a side wind of L 10 mph and a rear wind of 15 mph.

With this information, it is only a matter of seconds to complete the work. Reading pre-computed answers from your card:

	plus	minus
One square weight—effect is	38	
Powder temperature 40 degrees		73
Old VE		211
Air temperature 38 degrees	2	
Rear wind 15mph	21	
Density 97.4 per cent	10	
	71 - 284	
	+ 71	
	- 213	
	yards effect	

Compare the number of operations involved:

	Firing Tables	Card
Weight of projectile	4	1
Powder temperature	5	1
Old VE	3	1

Air temperature	4	1
Rear wind	2	1
Density	4	1
	22	6

Note that no plus or minus quantities are to be multiplied, yielding right numbers with wrong signs.

For deflection, card data show drift R 4, lateral wind effect in mils 0.2; times 10 mph this equals L 2 mils effect, total effects R 2, correction L 2, at the range of 3787 (4000 yards minus 213).

GFT setting: 3787 over 307 (book elevation for 4000 yards)

In combat this system proved more satisfactory than metro slide rules and graphical methods on squared paper; it was much quicker and more accurate than standing procedure. Time was reduced for two computers cross-checking results from ten minutes to

two minutes per problem, by average, not metro-specialist, personnel.

In teaching new men it greatly shortened the time needed for them to learn how to solve a metro problem.

In an 8-inch howitzer battalion, the average work load was three metro corrections for each of two azimuths. When we began receiving metros every hour, the work became an almost impossible burden, by standard methods. Pre-computed answers made it easy to keep up with the latest information.

What was the result upon firing?

To keep battalions on their toes during the Battle of the Bulge, group required them to fire occasional rounds at a target observed by the group plane. The order came in:

Use Line 2			
CH 4 - 4,000 yds			
WT. PROJ.	1 sq.	2 sq.	3 sq.
	+38	0	-38
POW. TEMP.	OF	yds	EFFECTS
0	-178	34 -92	70 0
2	-173	36 -86	72 +5
4	-168	38 -79	74 +10
6	-164	40 -73	76 +15
8	-159	42 -68	78 +19
10	-154	44 -63	80 +24
12	-149	46 -58	82 +29
14	-144	48 -53	84 +34
16	-139	50 -49	86 +39
18	-134	52 -44	88 +44
20	-130	54 -39	90 +49
22	-125	56 -34	92 +53
24	-120	58 -29	94 +58
26	-115	60 -24	96 +63
28	-110	62 -19	98 +68
30	-105	64 -15	100 +73
32	-99	66 -10	101 +78
		68 -5	102 +83
OLD VE: - 211			
Drift: R4 Lat.Wind: 0.2 m			

CH 4 - 4,000 yds			
AIR TEMP.	OF	yds	EFFECTS
10	+5	50	+2 80 -2
20	+4	60	+1 90 -3
30	+3	70	0 100 -4
			-1 110 -5
REAR WIND	mph	yds	ALL PLUS
1	1	7	10 40 56
2	3	8	11 50 70
3	4	9	13 60 84
4	6	10	14 70 98
5	7	20	28 80 112
6	8	30	42 90 126
DENSITY	%	yds	%
90	+40	95	+20 100 0
90.5	+38	95.5	+18 100.5 -2
91	+36	96	+16 101 -4
91.5	+34	96.5	+14 101.5 -6
92	+32	97	+12 102 -8
92.5	+30	97.5	+10 102.5 -10
93	+28	98	+8 103 -12
93.5	+26	98.5	+6 103.5 -14
94	+24	99	+4 104 -16
94.5	+22	99.5	+2 104.5 -18

Example of a vest-pocket metro with both sides of the card shown

one round, FFE. Metro data was two hours old. As the HCO was plotting the coordinates, a new metro came in. When the elevation went down it contained the new weather corrections. Observer's sensing: "I zero over." The sensing on the next battalion: "400 over."

From a carefully surveyed base, flash observers spotted a German staff car stopped at a crossroads with one of the officers, map in hand, consulting the signboards. Range was about 7,000. The excited survey experts furnished us coordinates to the nearest tenth of a yard. Adjustment was impractical because the car would take off after the first round. The HCO bore down on the plotting and the S-3 used the most precise corrections; then—"On the way!" At the end of time of flight, the phone operator cried: "Burst!"—but got no answer. "What happened to that one?" he asked.

"Wait 'til the smoke clears away," replied the flash crewman. There was a slight delay. "As near as we can see through the telescope, that one landed in the front seat."

Metro data figured by this method were used in harassing a crossroads; C Battery; one round; range about 4,000; time, midnight. The next day we moved on and saw for ourselves the precise results. This volley had straddled the intersection. About fifty yards to the left, one shell had burst in the street and bashed in part of a house. The structure on the left far corner had a neat hole in the front wall and a shambles inside. To the right, a hole in the roof testified to the passage of incoming mail—this was the house on the short right side of the crossing—and a smashed house front farther to the right across the street designated the remaining burst. Confidence in our vest-pocket metro went up.

Fire direction personnel were convinced that accurate and frequent metro-solving was worth while.

Winter weather on the German border was so constant that for the first round of registration in a new position we often applied old corrections, and got very close with them. There wasn't much wind, and changes in the trajectory were largely due to cold; so if your ears tingled, you could apply a K of about plus seventy yards to improve map data. This might be applicable to winter fighting in Korea.

YOU AND YOUR ARMY

(Continued from page 6)

In his *Quarterly* article, Captain Flynn argued that there are many instances from the last war in which "a person armed with a rifle or an automatic weapon would delay the advance of a squad, platoon, company, and even a battalion despite the fact that not one casualty resulted from this cleverly placed weapon." Team-type firing including battle drill and transition firing are more valuable to the soldier than the "monotony, boredom, and apathy which associates itself with the program of mechanical training, preliminary rifle instruction and range firing," he wrote.

In countering this kind of talk one advocate of better marksmanship—Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Taylor—wrote in the *Quarterly*:

"Actually he [Flynn] is one of a surprisingly large group which, since the past war, holds to the theory that individual accuracy—that is, single-shot accuracy—is unimportant and that individual or unit volume of fire is the only answer. Some members of this school of thought even advocate doing away with teaching the fundamentals of marksmanship—just show the soldier how to load the rifle and where the trigger is located. They contend that the natural inability of the firer to hit any particular point target will undoubtedly result in better distribution of unit fire. They say that the expert will put all his shots in a very small space and consequently the unit will not achieve proper distribution of fire over the entire target area. At one time the French are supposed to have held somewhat to this theory, but frankly I have never heard of an example where this theory made history. I have read somewhere a German account of the devastating accuracy of U. S. rifle fire when they first encountered the Marines in World War I..."

Then there are the instructions of General Patton to his corps and division commanders before the invasion of Normandy:

"Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical tar-

gets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area occupied by the enemy. Use *marching fire*. It reduces the accuracy of the enemy's fire and increases our confidence. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide."

General Patton would seem to be on Captain Flynn's side, but, we hasten to add, not necessarily so.

Colonel Taylor argued that Colonel S. L. A. Marshall's finding that all too frequently only fifteen to twenty-five per cent of the riflemen in front lines fired their rifles supports his case. The rifleman who didn't fire was afraid he would miss the target (because he had been inadequately trained) and reveal his own location to an enemy who, presumably, would be marksman enough to hit him.

Well, Colonel Marshall's fifteen to twenty-five per cent could prove just the opposite. How about the argument that hours of squeezing, and aiming, and fixed-range firing had made the combat rifleman reluctant to fire except when he saw a clearly outlined target? Consequently he carried his rifle day after day waiting for the time when an obliging enemy would pop up before him as clear as an "A" target rising from a pit three hundred yards away.

We are told that in this new war the rear-area service soldier has to defend himself from bands of infiltrators. That means he is going to have to know intimately and well how to shoot his rifle and the simple tactics of the rifle squad. That the training program, including the type of instruction in rifle firing, fit his needs is all important.

One thing is quite clear. We are no longer a nation of sharpshooters, if we ever were, and so we ought to go into this business of how to train our soldiers to shoot the U. S. Army rifle with cold logic and such scientific assistance as we can get. Maybe if we called on the scientists to help us, they could resolve the differences between the Captains Flynn and Colonels Taylor.

THE COST OF AMERICAN SECURITY

STEFAN T. POSSONY


MORE than a year ago another car crashed into mine. Even today my wife and I have not recovered and the cost has been thousands of dollars. The other driver was not insured and has no money. I carried no insurance for medical expenses. I thought I couldn't afford the extra cost.

It is the *first* duty of the sovereign, said Adam Smith, the founding father of economic science, to protect the people from violence and invasion. Yet for several years authorities have been saying that the United States *simply could not afford* to pay for military security.

Before K-day, our government, in all its collective wisdom, was as foolish as I was about full insurance coverage.

We couldn't afford" what obviously the Soviet Union, a nation considerably poorer than ours, had been affording all along. We rightly pride ourselves on our free enterprise. Yet we credited the "planned" Soviet economy with the double capability of continuous expansion and of maintaining a military establishment far larger than our own. Wasn't that much the same as saying that the Soviet system is the more efficient one?

There is just one single thing our American economy cannot afford. That is destruction at the hands of the Communists. Our system is fully capable of satisfying *both* our economic and military needs. The professional "economizers," the "capitalists," and all the freedom-loving people everywhere ought to thank Joe



National security cannot be bought cheaply on any business-as-usual installment plan

Stalin for ordering his forces into South Korea. For he conclusively proved that the United States *must* provide for its security—or perish.

It has now been decided to end the dangerous military weakness of the United States and its allies. The military budget of the United States has been boosted by more than seventy-five per cent practically overnight. The "permanent" strength of the armed forces may be brought up to three million men. The military assistance program is to be accelerated. Let us hope all this still leaves us time.

The Korean War has swallowed part of the additional expenditures. The rest is earmarked for rebuilding our military strength to offset the world Communist threat. How strong do we have to be in order to checkmate the Soviet bloc's offensive power?

AT first glance the answer seems to be simple. Our forces must be at least as powerful as the Soviet's. If we want to buy the hope of avoiding World

War III they ought to become superior to them. And we should keep so strong and ready that the USSR would lose not only the last battles of a war but also the first ones. But how strong are the Soviets?

The Soviet military budget of 1950 called for roughly eighty billion rubles. There are, besides, a number of military items hidden elsewhere in its budget. Atomic research and production, aircraft production, a large part of the armament industry, military rail and road buildings, and a great part of equipment maintenance and other purely military outlays, such as training of reserves—most or all of these, there is reason to believe, are not listed under military expenditures. One authoritative estimate has

set the total of Soviet military spending at 180 billion rubles a year rather than 80 billion. More conservative estimates make it 130 billion. And that is about twenty per cent of the national income. There is little doubt that we must consider 130 billion as rock-bottom.

But how much is that in dollars? At the official exchange rate of four rubles to the dollar, it is 32.5 billion dollars. At the rate of 5.4 to 1 in force until recently, it would be 24 billion.

Also, the Soviet currency is overvalued perhaps by double its real worth which would give us roughly 16.5 billion dollars. Allow ten per cent for error and we get a bracket of 15 to 18 billion. The satellites spend at least another billion on their forces. So a reasonable yearly estimate for the whole Soviet bloc (minus China) is 16 to 19 billion dollars.

Next, does our own dollar buy as much as the Soviet military "dollar?" The answer is apparently "no."

For one thing, Soviet military pay is considerably lower than ours. On the four-year average since 1946, we

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spent forty per cent of our military budget, to pay, feed, clothe and transport our military people. The Soviets buy much more manpower for that same money, and use a larger part of their military budget for equipment or both. For example, if they spent only thirty per cent for personnel—and they probably spent less—they would have been able, with our own pre-Korean budget, to keep 500,000 more men under arms than we did. Or they could have bought fifteen per cent more of modern equipment; seven planes or guns where we could only buy six.

Another big item; the Soviet forces are close to their probable battlefields, except in the air. In general they do not face logistical problems as serious and costly as ours. In the main they need short-range ground logistics. But we require duplication of long-range land and sea logistics. Hence, with an equal number of soldiers the Soviets can maintain more combat divisions. A large part of our own strength must go into service units.

Soviet equipment is probably cheaper too, owing to low wages and controlled prices. There is no argument over the fact that Soviet forces use weapons of much simplified, stripped-down—and therefore more economical—design.

The Soviets gained a further advantage through foresightedness. While we were selling and destroying World War II equipment which cost us some 35 billion dollars, they not only kept their war surplus intact but increased it by capture and occasional purchases of Allied weapons.

All in all, the Soviet military dollar is certainly worth a good deal more than our own. But how much more is anybody's guess. We have seen that they are spending from 16 to 19 billion a year on "defense." If we subtract the costs of Korea from our supplemental budget, we then find that the current military investments of the two countries are much the same—dollarwise. But that means the Soviets are still buying more striking power than we are, because they can get more of it for a dollar.

MR. W. Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, and now Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, has stated that the Soviets lead us in most weapons categories, sometimes by a big margin.

If some types of Soviet equipment

are not up to our standards, other highly important weapons—tanks, for example—seem to be first-rate weapons. Besides, some degree of inferiority in quality can often be made up for by numbers. Who knows what surprises the Soviets hold in store in this respect? We certainly shouldn't be too complacent about it. If they have been spending twenty-five per cent of their military outlay for new equipment (as compared with our seventeen per cent), they would have put about twice as much into new weapons as we have since the war. Then

TABLE 1. The Rising Cost of Defense

	World War II	1950 (before Korea)
Ground rifle	\$ 21	\$ 64
Medium tank	15,000	200,000
Antiaircraft gun	10,000	200,000
Medium bomber	100,000	1,500,000
Paratrooper	50,000	750,000
Infantry division (with its original equipment but exclusive of pay, clothing, food, etc.)	14,000,000	74,000,000
Airborne division	15,000,000	75,000,000
Armored division	20,000,000	200,000,000

allowing for their undestroyed war surplus, they may well have today three times as much money in new and not-so-new (but still usable) equipment.

As to manpower, the USSR had about three times as many men under arms than the pre-Korean American forces. But, considering the factors of distance, concentration, initiative and surprise, the Soviets have had to five- to six-fold superiority. Our present program of a military establishment of three million would still leave the Soviet Union with a superiority of two or three to one—*provided Soviet armaments are not speeded up, an unlikely assumption.*

Asad result for a 50 billion dollar investment in security over the last four years! And in that time, we should remember, our military costs have doubled for small arms and are five to seven times greater for heavy equipment (See Table 1).

As we have seen, the Soviet Union spends a minimum of twenty per cent of its national income directly or indirectly for military purposes. We ourselves have been spending six per cent. How much more should we have spent? Or, more to the point today, how much more do we have to spend?

First, we must come up to the Soviet expenditure of about 18 billion. We must allow for a future increase in Soviet armaments of at least two

billion dollars a year, and we must adjust for the greater military purchasing power of the Soviet "dollar"—let's say twenty-five per cent. The whole thing adds up to about 25 billion dollars.

But we also have to finish the Korean war; contribute to the armaments of our allies; and, as fast as we can do so, take out those forms of additional insurance we have been thinking ourselves too poor to buy before. These are as follows:

- (1) Strong continental air defenses with all-weather fighters
- (2) Up-to-date guided missiles and other modern equipment to protect our cities and industries from devastating attack
- (3) Extensive civil defense preparations
- (4) Enough and plenty of big air-transport planes to carry troops fast to the assistance of our forward bases and our allies.
- (5) Still more fully manned and ready divisions
- (6) Preparations for more extensive industrial mobilization
- (7) Numerous other measures.

In 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a "safe" American military budget would require more than 30 billion dollars per year. This figure *did not* include extraordinary expenses such as MDAP and Korea. It included a certain amount of service "fat." It is probably still as good a planning figure as any. If so, the United States would have to spend at least twelve per cent of its gross national product on military security.

There are those who for economic reasons insist that this can't be done. I differ with them for several reasons. In the first place, the history of many industrialized nations shows that an outlay of twelve per cent can be made without appreciably reducing the standard of living. In Nazi Germany the living standard actually rose along with a huge and a growing military outlay. It happened here, too, in World War II. And to some extent it is even true of the poorly managed Soviet economy which has been expanding at a fairly rapid pace despite huge military investments. I do not deny at all that military expenditures are "unproductive," although they do give some positive returns in more rapid technological progress and expanding transport facilities, and in training and education.

How, then, can we afford these things?

WELL what do we do with our national income now? What do you spend your salary for? What do I spend mine for? And how do corporations and other business use their incomes?

We seem to need about fifty-five per cent of our annual total income for the physical needs of our people and the maintenance of our industrial plant. The other forty-five per cent may be divided into the following: luxury items, industrial expansion, savings, and military expenditures. Luxury items account for twenty per cent, more or less. Investment needs range anywhere from five to fifteen. Savings run from five to ten per cent. Cuts in these three categories can, if need be, boost the military expenditure very considerably. And there is no question of the need.

It is perfectly true that spending more for military purposes would cut the consumption of non-essential luxury goods, and reduce the amount of yearly savings, and perhaps slow down our industrial expansion. But none of these items would have to be eliminated entirely or even in large

In this connection a Gallup poll of August 1950 showed that sixty per cent of the voters are in favor of paying the increased cost of defense by taxes, and only nineteen per cent were in favor of borrowing. (During the last war, the U.S. paid forty-five

TABLE 3

in billions of dollars for one year

Corporate profits after taxes	20
Income from interest	5
Expenditures for furniture, tobacco, recreation	18
Gambling	4
Automobiles and their use	12.5
Foreign aid and grants	8
Veterans' education, loans, and unemployment	2.7
	69.2

*Of this amount, twelve billion was not distributed to shareholders.
*Estimates on gambling run from six to ten billion. One billion on slot machines alone!

per cent of the war cost from taxes.) For once, the voter is in agreement with the expert as shown by a recent statement of sixty-five leading economists who called for an increase in taxes "to cover the rise in expenditure fully and to balance the budget."¹

Table 4 contains my suggestions on where to get more money for necessary security.

SUCH a program would perhaps cover the cost of American security. But let us assume that it won't be enough—that there will still be a deficit which cannot be covered by more taxes. Could we borrow? Can we add even more to our vast national debt without going bankrupt?

I want to say, first, that I have no confidence in any theory that a high national debt is a blessing in disguise. Public debt I consider an evil—though far less an evil than unpreparedness.

Our present national debt is about the equivalent of one year's national income. By comparison, the national debt both of 1865 and 1932 was 0.4 of a year's income. But the most important relationship appears to be the amount we pay out annually as interest on our national debt (not the amount of the debt itself) as compared to our national income. Today this proportion is only a little higher than it was in 1868 right after the Civil War. It seems to me that the size of our debt is much less significant than most of us generally assume.

If we agree that the relationship between our national debt and our

interest payments on it ought not to increase, and if we further assume that our national income will double within twenty-five years (it all but doubled in the ten years, between 1940 and 1950), then we could borrow approximately ten billion dollars per year more without adding to the relative burden of the debt.

So, about 42 billion dollars per year could be made available for American security without hurting anyone seriously. A military budget of 30 to 40 billion dollars would end the superiority of Soviet armaments.

A startling figure? Not quite. The dollar now is worth only one-half of what it was ten years ago. The cost of military equipment has at least doubled. Hence a military budget of forty billion dollars corresponds to a pre-Pearl Harbor budget of some ten billion dollars. Since our actual military outlay in 1941 was 6.2 billion, a current forty billion military budget would be just sixty-one per cent larger which, considering the changes in the world situation and the inadequacy of the pre-Pearl Harbor preparations, hardly can be termed excessive.

If we really want to frighten the

TABLE 2

per cent of gross national income

Sustenance and maintenance	55
Military security	12
Investment	15
Savings	5
Luxury items	10

part. Even a much higher military budget would not require us to abandon our standard of living, or stop short our industrial growth.

The rough listing of our national income as shown in Table 2 will make this clear.

There is just one change here. Simply by cutting our luxury-items spending in half, we get the twelve per cent we need for military spending. Note especially sustenance and maintenance continue to permit a comfortable life.

There are some impressive figures on our economic strength in Table 3.

The latest reported average tax rate on individual income was about twelve per cent. This was for 1946 when taxes were considerably higher. Early in 1950 the average rate was estimated at less than nine per cent. If we were to go back to the 1946 rate, about six billion dollars more would become available and the burden still would be far from back-breaking.

TABLE 4

billion \$

Cut luxury spending 20%* (including gambling)	4.8
Cut automobile production and use 20%	2.4
Take 20% from undistributed corporate profits	2.4
Cut foreign aid by 20%	1.0
Increase individual tax rates to 12% average*	6.8
Cut agricultural subsidies and some veteran items 10%	1.0
Sales taxes and miscellaneous types of revenue	1.4
Total new revenue	19.8
Defense money previously allocated and covered by existing revenue	13.0
Total outlay available on pay-as-you-go basis	32.8

*If it is technically feasible to control spending on selected luxury items effectively, then the cut on luxury spending should be still greater and the increase of individual taxes less.

Soviets into peacefulness—is there any other way to maintain peace?—we had better think in broad terms and keep on doing so. The security of the United States and world peace cannot be bought cheaply through the business-as-usual, politics-as-usual methods of too-little-and-too-late. We must abandon the idea that we can buy security through a military instalment plan. Let us make the needed effort now to save the tears and blood of an otherwise unavoidable third world war.

CELEBRATIONS

How to Get an Intelligence Manual

Some months ago the *Infantry Journal* published a fine piece by Major Neil G. Stewart, which lambasted the lack of up-to-date training texts for future G-2s and S-2s. Major Stewart ended by suggesting, rather rosily, I thought, that "a simple manual—written to give the G-2 or S-2 all the information he needs to provide his commander with accurate, adequate and timely information of the enemy and of actual and possible areas of operation." Even more optimistically, he urged that the manual when written "be given Army-wide distribution and adopted for resident instruction in all service schools that teach the production of combat intelligence."

Major Stewart and about a thousand others of us, too. Anyone who has even found himself suddenly made responsible for -2 section duties, even at battalion level, will cheer the proposal and wonder if Major Stewart thinks there's any chance.

The biggest difficulty, in trying to produce the sort of combat intelligence handbook that Major Stewart and you and I would like to own is simply a question of selectivity. What are we going to include between its covers? And how can we be sure that what we choose is right?

Late in 1946 the *Infantry Journal* Press published a small book by Lieutenant Colonel Stedman Chandler and Colonel Robert W. Robb, called *Front-Line Intelligence*. It ran to 172 closely printed pages and was—for my money—the best "crystal-ball gazers' guide" available to Infantry intelligence personnel in the wake of World War II. For sheer clarity, cogency and horse sense, it takes the cake. But—before we get too excited with Major Stewart over the stinginess of extant official manuals on this whole subject, listen to the wise concluding words of Colonels Chandler and Robb:

"... Our table of contents is comprehensive . . . Our treatment, we frankly admit, is not. Why? Because nobody could compress within a read-

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

able book a comprehensive treatment of the many and divergent subjects under the general heading of Combat Intelligence." Remember, they wrote this after doing a really superior job for the would-be G-2 and S-2, covering in a relatively small space more (and more helpful) material than I have ever found in all the field manuals on -2 work together. They were just aware of their human limitations as authors.

But here is what the Army *could* do, if it wants to help out future "crystal-ball gazers" in the way Major Stewart suggests. It could take *Front-Line Intelligence*, plus some of the more pertinent "lessons from combat" in World War II, plus the latest bits of practical wisdom to emerge from Korea, and hand the whole business over to a team of crack digest editors for boiling down.

The result might not look like a field manual, but who is going to complain about that? I'd hazard a small bet that it would become the cherished Bible of every poor cuss who, like Major Stewart and myself, is now wasting his breath bemoaning the "captive balloon approach" to combat intelligence training.

It would be read—and the reading might save some lives and equipment.

LT. EDWARD ANDROVETTE
MI-USAR

The Mishandling of Noncoms

In the course of getting back into the business of combat readiness, are we going to use or misuse our non-commissioned officers? The noncom has been generally mishandled for the last several years—at least since 1945.

There are offices in the Army where senior sergeants are employed as mere messengers. This is simply

disgraceful. Master and technical sergeants may be found driving motor vehicles, cooking, pulling targets, doing all sorts of chores which are not dishonorable, of course, but are—as regular occupations—beneath the dignity and prestige which should be the due of a sergeant.

Further mishandling of noncoms has come from the timidity and cautiousness of senior officers. Many commanders have prescribed, in the strictest terms, that officers shall perform certain duties which should rightfully be the job of noncoms. They have done this because they wanted to be able to say to higher authority, in case things went wrong, "An officer was present and in charge, which indicates that I, at least, have fully discharged my responsibility." I know of no other explanation of why officers are so frequently required personally to ride the truck returning girls from a company picnic, to inspect each rifle before it is brought back from the firing line, to count the canteen covers turned in for salvage, to inventory the contents of the kitchen shelves—personally to do many things that noncoms should do.

The absurdity of this is brought into true focus when, on the first day on the battlefield, the noncom is suddenly handed the stickiest kind of a job and has to do it strictly on his own. This job, suddenly thrust upon him, must be appraised in terms of human lives, and more important still, will have important bearing on the accomplishment of the battle mission of the company, battalion, and regiment. Should we be surprised that the noncom so unfairly put on the spot will botch the job?

When the solution to the situation is so obvious it is strange that we frequently fail to use it. Throughout his training and subsequent service the noncom should be treated as a leader, a noncommissioned officer. He should be held strictly responsible for the training and discipline of his men, and for the performance of all

"Let me make clear that there is nothing wrong in any officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, of any rank, pitching in personally to assist the detail under his charge in the accomplishment of an assigned fatigue job while yet retaining direction of it—such action is, indeed, characteristic of good leadership. I hope the reader will perceive and acknowledge the difference between this and the regular assignment of the NCO to a job which should be detailed to a private or civilian.

sorts of duties requiring initiative and integrity. He should be required to perform many of the duties without superior supervision. His opinions on military matters should be sought, and considered. If, in his performance of separate and unsupervised jobs, he falls down and gets his superiors in trouble, he should be broken—and the officer should thank his stars that he found him out before the outfit went into battle.

All that we do, these days, is or should be in preparation for war. In this situation let's not treat our non-coms as high-paid privates. A man simply cannot and will not function as a leader in such a restricted and unnatural atmosphere.

COL. HAMILTON H. HOWZE
Armor

Adjust your Sights For Keeps

Two conditions now exist that hinder the average soldier's ability as a marksman, especially in field firing. The first is the unfamiliarity, or in most cases the complete ignorance of nine out of ten soldiers with the proper use of the elevation drum on the M1 rifle. The second is the wide variation between the center of the wind gauge and the actual zero of most rifles.

The unit commander has the means and can easily correct both conditions. The first he can correct by following instructions pertaining to sight setting as prescribed in FM 23-5, and the second by careful supervision of firing of all his weapons and making corrections as provided therein.

This discussion is concerned particularly with the M1 rifle. However, it is applicable to the carbine and the BAR. All three weapons are manufactured for one purpose—combat usefulness—and they are the finest weapons made for their purpose.

Current training practices instruct the pupil to set his rear sight on the M1 rifle at so many clicks to fire at 200 yards, usually 8 or 10. Then he is instructed to go up so many clicks to fire 300 and 500 yards, respectively, and some other fancy instructions (depending on the instructor's imagination and the pupil trying to figure out short cuts) about how for each increase of 100 yards of range he is to go up so many clicks. Now, when this pupil gets to transition, or field firing, and he sees a target at 400 or 600 yards, he immediately tries to

guess how many clicks he should use (he never fired these on known distance) or draws a "course bead" or "fine bead" if he was raised in the squirrel-shooting country. In either case, he is very apt to be wrong.

Let us go back to the 200-yard range, and do it properly. Have the pupil set his sight setting at 8 or 10 clicks, and fire until he has found the proper elevation setting. Experience shows that this will vary from 2 to 20 clicks of elevation for this range. If it is more or less than these limits, the front sight should be discarded and a new one installed. Having found the correct number of clicks for 200 yards for his rifle the pupil then locks the sight and takes out his screw driver and loosens the set screw which fastens the elevation or range drum. The loosened range drum is moved until the 200-yard mark is opposite the index mark on the rear-sight mount and then clamped tightly in place by applying the screw driver to the set screw and tightening. He writes down the number of clicks and doesn't forget it. Occasionally he should check by counting clicks to see if the range dial is properly set at 200 yards.

From then on the pupil can forget about how many clicks it takes for other ranges. All he has to do is to unlock the sight and turn the elevation drum to the desired range. Experience in match firing has shown that the elevation drum is absolutely correct up to 600 yards. After that range, the drum is correct, but the firer has difficulty lining up his sights correctly due to the large front and peep sights. How to adjust and use the elevation-scale drum is carefully and fully set forth in FM 23-5, but alas! it apparently hasn't been followed too closely.

Let us discuss the second condition, that of excessive lateral rear-sight adjustments. When an M1 rifle is zeroed in, it is not at all uncommon for the rear sight to be 6 or 7 clicks to the right or left of center. Occasionally some will be found that are more than that. Once the zero windage is determined, wind corrections can always be applied from that point regardless of whether it is at the exact center of the wind gauge or several clicks off. However, it is much better if the wind gauge reads within 1 or 2 clicks of the exact center.

Fortunately, this can be easily adjusted. After the zero setting has been determined, simply loosen the

front sight and move it over the same distance the rear sight is off center and in the opposite direction. With a little luck the first adjustment will be exactly right; otherwise try again.

Occasionally, front sights become loose and even fall off. In this event the man has to zero his rifle all over again. A simple precaution will prevent such trouble. Once the rifle is zeroed, make a scratch mark across the face of the front sight and base with a file. This will not prevent the front sight from becoming loose and falling off, but in the event it does, all that has to be done is to put the front sight back on the base and match up the scratch marks.

Men come and go in units. At any given time any unit has a substantial number of men armed with weapons they have never fired. A unit commander may insure good shooting if he is certain that his weapons have been zeroed properly and two records maintained of such zeroings: (1) Keep a roster of all weapons showing weapon number and correct sight setting for 200 yards; (2) place a slip of paper in the butt of the rifle showing the correct sight setting for 200 yards.

Accurate shooting will increase fire power and its effect immensely.

LT. COL. FRANK M. CROW
Infantry

Don't File 'em, Throw 'em Away

Every minute spent on paper work represents a loss of time from training for some soldier or neglect of training by some officer. This is most apparent in companies and battalions.

One big way to have more time for training is to cut out all time-wasting tasks. The filing and sorting of non-essential documents for example. The classification and filing of general and special orders that do not pertain to anyone in your unit. Also, the saving of daily bulletins of all units higher than the next higher unit; and the collection of army, corps and division orders.

FM 101-5 (SOFM) specifically designates the adjutant general (or adjutant) as the office of record. You can throw away the above documents with impunity. The regimental adjutant saves them for you—if you have to refer to one, a telephone call should produce its exact wording.

LT. COL. JAMES H. HAYES
Infantry

Mobilization Progress

In the months that followed the fateful 25 June 1950, the nation's mobilization planners were in a plight more aggravating than that of the boy on the icy hill who slipped back two steps for every forward one he made. The Army, starting with a scratch force of 600,000 or fewer men organized into ten under-strength divisions, plus a few regimental combat teams likewise under-strength and supporting units organized for peacetime rather than combat support, committed six infantry divisions in Korea in a few short months and at the same time made certain definite steps toward materially increasing its overall strength. How much more depended upon the developing situation and mobilization planners are without crystal balls. Too much mobilization could be disastrous to the Nation's production goals and too little could be catastrophic.

The first task was to get a fighting force into Korea that could handle the North Korean Communist armies. This was done in brilliant fashion as the victories in the early fall testified. Under-strength units were brought to full strength by stripping other units of trained men. Independent combat teams were attached to divisions which had been getting along with two regiments instead of three. Men with critically-needed skills were in such urgent demand that priorities on their services were difficult to establish and maintain.

But an army that could handle the North Koreans was far from strong enough to take on the Chinese Red Army, whose entry, as General MacArthur observed, made it an entirely new war.

The entry of the Chinese into the Korean war had and will have a profound influence on the future of the world. But it is doubtful if it increased the problems of the mobilization planners very much. They were already over their heads in problems. But they had made some tangible progress and more could be expected.

Four National Guard divisions and two Guard regimental combat teams along with various other types of units were federalized and went into

training. Two more National Guard divisions were ordered to be mobilized after the first of the year and are now in training.

Reserves, enlisted and commissioned, who were not members of organized units were called to active duty.

The handling of the call-up of National Guard units and Reserves, individually or by units, was a subtle problem. If it was an all-out mobilization the best organized units could be called up first and the others as camps and training grounds became available. But with less than all-out mobilization on the boards it was important to keep the organized civilian component units where they were so that they could be called up in a hurry if it became necessary.

At the end of the year the Army changed its policy somewhat and announced that combat-trained captains and lieutenants in organized National Guard and Reserve Corps units could volunteer for active duty. They would be among the 7,500 volunteer officers the Army wants to get in March. If not enough of them volunteer, reservists not members of organized units will be ordered to duty.

The draft brought in good raw material in limited numbers and would bring in more as the Army's capacity for training them improved. Here too was a problem. The Korean war had stripped the country of the trained Regulars, especially junior officers and noncoms, who are the

prime instrument for training recruits. Until the Army could build up its store of trained cadres the number of draftees it could assimilate was limited. There were indications that that point had been reached by the end of the year when the Army announced that its draft calls (80,000 per month) for the first few months of 1951 would be vastly larger than the number it had been taking.

By the end of the fiscal year the strength of the Army probably could be almost three times what it was in June 1950.

Geared for Production

The number of men the armed forces put in uniform would have an effect on the capacity of the nation to produce the equipment and munitions that would be needed by the military forces and their allies. This problem was one among many that occupied the time and thoughts of the top planners in the Defense Department. General Marshall has mentioned it a number of times and Secretary Pace of the Army spoke of it when he told a congressional committee: "I cannot emphasize too strongly that the key to efficient mobilization is the careful synchronization of the mobilization and training of military manpower with the mobilization and conversion of industry."

Properly geared, the nation's capacity to produce munitions for war is greater than even the stupendous production totals it recorded during World War II. To give production the direction it needed the Commander in Chief appointed Mr. Charles E. Wilson, President of General Electric Company, the nation's mobilization director. Mr. Wilson, whose World War II record in the War Production Board marked him as an able and energetic administrator, was given authority greater than that held by top mobilizers in 1942-45. Among his close assistants will be General Lucius D. Clay, now retired. General Clay was the Army's foremost production expeditor during the war years and later served as deputy to Mr. Byrnes when he was Director of War Mobilization.

In the months since 25 June there have been repeated cries that the nation was not rearming fast enough and that there was feet-dragging and confusion in Washington, especially, perhaps, in the Pentagon building. The statements of General Marshall



NEW INSIGNIA

Pictured above is the insignia of the new Armor arm. It embodies the crossed sabers of its parent, the Cavalry, and the front of a tank.

The merged Artillery arm will wear the familiar crossed cannons insignia of the former Field Artillery.

and the one quoted above by Mr. Pace did not satisfy the critics. But the critics could not be told of the planning that was going on behind the scenes. It takes time to spend \$1, \$10 or \$25 billions wisely. Orders are going out and have been going out. The declaration of national emergency is helping. Before the declaration the armed forces were required by law to advertise for competitive bids; now they can negotiate contracts. Also the establishing of the Office of Mobilization Director enables the government to put the heat on establishments which are reluctant to put aside private orders for government work. There are such.

The Army will be the earliest beneficiary of the increased production although it may not be noticeably so. This is because the Navy and Air Force both were getting more "hardware" under pre-Korean budgets than the Army.

Since the end of the shooting war in 1945 the Army had been doing without new equipment. General Bradley noted that from 1945 to 1950 the Army had only ten per cent of all military procurement.

The modernization of Army equipment is the most critical problem he has had to face as Chief of Staff. General Collins said at a budget hearing. He repeated the statement in last month's issue of this Journal stating that "modernization of equipment is the No. 1 problem of the Army."

Army tank production was almost at a standstill until the Korean war came along. Mr. Archibald Alexander, Under Secretary of the Army, recently noted that while the Army had only \$29 millions for tank production last year it will spend more than \$1 billion this year and more will be required later. This will put tank production in high gear and within a year the Army should be receiving tanks in quantity.

In addition to Army equipment and weapons, the Air Force will have large contracts for aircraft and the Navy for both aircraft and ships. The guided missile program is being stepped up and there is the all-important weapons program of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Details of all of these programs necessarily are classified. Fewer facts and figures were being made public—which in itself was a healthy sign of the growing sense of responsibility of the nation.

Air Force

The Air Force had a four-pronged plan for making American air power supreme. It includes aircraft production, mobilization and training of men, increases in the number of air bases here and overseas, and the production of equipment other than aircraft.

The President has said that the nation will be turning out planes five times the present rate within a year. Aircraft production figures are necessarily classified but there have been reports that production will emphasize the latest jet-powered fighters and bombers. The automobile industry will certainly be brought into the aircraft production field.

In manpower the Air Force expects to reach a figure somewhere near 900,000 by the end of the fiscal year. The number of groups will be increased to 68 or more from the 48 the Air Force had last June.

By the end of 1950 the Air Force had activated 11 former bases and it announced at year's end that 13 more will be reactivated within the coming year. All of these are within the continental U.S. and will be used in training Air Force men and units.

Navy

Within the year the Navy will double the number of ships it has in fighting trim and increase in strength to about 800,000 officers and men. It will emphasize antisubmarine measures and vastly increase its air strength. It hopes to build a huge flush-deck carrier similar to, but not as large, as the ill-fated *United States*, construction of which was stopped by former Secretary Louis Johnson.

The Marine Corps will have substantial growth. It now has an estimated 150,000 and 200,000 or more are contemplated. Many members of Congress would gladly vote to increase the Marine Corps even more and some Marines have talked of forming as many as four infantry divisions.

INFANTRY SCHOOL

The Job Grows Bigger

The Infantry School, anticipating a tremendously increased work-load, has been deep in plans on a large number of projects. The planners found almost immediately that the job of the

school would be quite unlike it was ten years earlier. Then a student who had even a remote knowledge of combat was a rarity and the training and instruction had to be thorough and from scratch. Today, though, the country boasts a great pool of combat-experienced men who need little more than a refresher course that will sharpen up old techniques and introduce the weapons and methods the Army has developed since 1945.

Three new problems have been started at Benning that show student officers and noncommissioned officers how to conduct practical battle indoctrination training. One is an infiltration course which requires trainees to negotiate obstacles under overhead machine-gun fire; another is the close-combat course which demonstrates quick and accurate use of weapons against surprise targets; the third is a combat-in-cities course which teaches techniques implied in its name. All three of these courses were taught at the Infantry School during World War II and were familiar to thousands of wartime infantrymen.

Student officers are being taught some subjects totally alien to any World War II experience they may have had. For example the use of helicopters in tactical operations and logistical support in forward combat areas is being taught. Also the "heavy drop" technique devised for airborne assault operations.

The "heavy drop" device is getting considerable attention these days. In the current (January) issue of the *Infantry School Quarterly*, Major Edward M. Flanagan, Artillery, argues that the "heavy drop" technique will eliminate the use of gliders. This is not exactly a new idea for it has been kicking around in airborne circles for some time, but Major Flanagan's ideas are worthy of consideration. Another article in the *Quarterly* describes a simple method for computing safe loads for cargo aircraft which is now being used by the 82d Airborne Division. Proper and safe loading of aircraft is the first step in getting the heavy stuff into the air where it can be dropped by parachute. You don't just roll a 105 how into a plane, tie it down and attach a parachute. The load has to be balanced in the plane and the tricks to that that the 82d Division has simplified are described in the *Quarterly* article by Captain J. K. Cockrell.

World Perimeters

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

THE FAR EAST

EVENTS in Korea have profoundly affected the international situation. When on 24 November, the Eighth Army crossed the Chongchon River and attacked to the northwest on a seventy-mile front in what was officially stated was to be an "all-out attack" there were available five U. S., five ROK divisions and allies equivalent to another division; about 150,000 men. Next day the extreme right was driven back some six miles by an enemy counterattack where for the first time large Chinese units were identified. On the 26th the enemy attacked the entire right wing, and drove it back two or more miles. Eighth Army reports for the 27th claimed no significant changes in the front, and estimated the enemy as five Chinese and eleven North Korean divisions; 160,000 men in all. Orders were issued to withdraw to the south side of the Chongchon.

On 28 November, Eighth Army explained the withdrawal as due to "overwhelming" enemy strength. This was the first time the strength of the enemy had been reported in such terms. General MacArthur's communiqué of the same day explained that the withdrawal was due to the intervention of Chinese forces and that this was a new war. He requested the United Nations to instruct him as to how he should meet this enemy. [United Nations has failed to issue instructions.] Eighth Army continued to retreat further and abandoned Pyongyang on 4 December. Whether this was due to orders from higher authority is not yet known.

From 24 November to 12 December three U. S. divisions (54,000 men) lost 5,885 men, and the allied contingent lost 1,014 more. Other divisions of Eighth Army, mostly ROK,

issued no casualty reports of the period. Losses reported average eleven per cent. Chinese losses, according to their report of 6 December, show 35,000 wounded present in hospitals. If Eighth Army was correct in estimating the Chinese at 60,000, they were all but exterminated. There is no report as to the losses of the North Koreans. Up to the end of December, the Communist army in west Korea undertook no pursuit, nor interference with the withdrawal of Eighth Army.

Meanwhile, commencing on 29 November, France and Great Britain on the highest level expressed their concern to the United States as to the war with China leading to an early outbreak of World War III. Their press suggested breaking off the contest with the Chinese even if this meant loss of prestige and abandonment of Korea. On the 30th President Truman at his press conference announced that there would be no appeasement toward China, for to do so would encourage new Communist aggressions. Mention having been made as to the use of the atomic bomb, the President replied—his exact words at press conferences are not quoted—that the use of *all* weapons was always under consideration.

This caused consternation in Western Europe. On the following day, 1 December, Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain decided to fly at once to Washington. He delayed one day to hold a four-hour conference with the French Premier. Their communiqué stated that they were in complete agreement as to what the Prime Minister was to say in Washington. He arrived there on the 4th, and at once conferred with President Truman.

On 6 December, a partial agreement between the two Chiefs of State was announced. The United States renounced a proposition to blockade

the China coast, but did order an embargo which applies only to American ships, which were forbidden to trade with China. The press reported that it was decided to hold the Inchon-Seoul beachhead for "several weeks" and that the Pusan beachhead might be held by three ROK divisions "for a while." This would indicate that Korea was to be abandoned.

This idea seems to have been set aside on the next day. Instructions sent to General MacArthur caused him to issue orders to X Corps in northeast Korea to withdraw to south of the 38th parallel. His instructions to Eighth Army have not been released but it was in fact also withdrawn to south of latitude 38, both movements having been completed by 24 December. Published explanations of the withdrawal constantly referred to the cause being the "overwhelming" enemy strength.

The conference at Washington ended on 8 December. It was agreed that the United States would give major consideration to the European Theater of Operations. In order to hasten organization of a Western European Army an early conference of the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance was ordered. No agreement was had as to the use of the atomic bomb, the disposition of Formosa or the war in Korea.

NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

IN case of war with the Soviet Union, the United States wants to be able to attack and overcome the enemy. The European Allies, on the contrary, are primarily interested in defense of their own countries. The divergence of views is a strategic weakness.

European allies are united in objecting to the United States using the atomic bomb in the Far East. They fear that if that occurs, Russia will retaliate. They do not believe that Russia would attempt, at least early in a war, to drop atomic bombs on American territory. The strength of the Soviet Air Force and the long flying distances involved seems to preclude such attempts until, and if, Russia secures air control. It is considered possible if not probable that Russia could drop atomic bombs over Western Europe. No European coun-

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try has atomic bombs of its own to retaliate, and they are without a defense against atomic attack.

What happens to the United States in the Far East is immaterial to most Europeans. They want protection for their own cities and peoples. They want the United States to stockpile atomic bombs, and should they be attacked, they expect the United States to rush to their aid with the atomic bombs. They desire that the United States never use the atomic bomb except as approved by them. President Truman seems to have refused to accept this point of view. Nevertheless, it will persist, and will materially affect the action of the Western European Allies.

The Washington Conference also agreed to the rearming of Germany. On 12 December, the three Allied High Commissioners to West Germany, presented to that government the North Atlantic plan, to raise German regimental combat teams. Only one German RCT would be assigned to the same division, but two other RCTs of different allies would be assigned. The division commander and staff might come from any nation in the pact, including Germany. The United States has not agreed to furnish RCTs for international divisions, nor have France or Great Britain. Germans would be associated with RCTs from Italy, the Benelux states, Norway, Denmark and Portugal. The Germans replied that this plan was unacceptable; insisted that Germans must be as free to organize troops as any other ally.

A second meeting was held on 20 December. It was agreed to discuss making peace with Germany and to appoint a board to examine into and report upon German participation in a Western European army. This board was immediately appointed. The U. S. member is Major General George P. Hays.

The West Germans discreetly let it be known that they had received an invitation from Communist Germany to discuss reuniting all of Germany. Germans are in general anti-Communist but are willing to play the Communists against the Allies, in order to make the best possible bargain for themselves. If Germany was promised complete independence, it would almost certainly desire to associate itself with the Atlantic Pact nations, rather than with the Communists.

France, Britain and the U.S. are

now engaged in strengthening their occupation forces in Germany. This is close to the Communist frontier. Concentrating troops near the enemy is a violation of elementary strategic principles. This may be expressed by Napoleon's maxim: "It is a principle that the union of various bodies must never be made near the enemy, because the enemy by concentrating his forces may not only prevent their junction, but may beat them separately."

The explanation for this apparent risk seems to have been given in the British Parliament. Among the members of that body are two ex-Chiefs of the Royal Air Force and other distinguished former officers of the RAF. Their consensus, apparently adopted by the British, was that if the NATO air forces based on Britain was brought up to a certain strength it would be able to hold up and disorganize any Soviet advance, regardless of the ground defense. The United States has sent to Great Britain substantial air units, and the combined U.S. and British strengths are approaching the numbers held sufficient to defeat a Soviet attack.

The Germans have no confidence in this plan. Before they start rearming they want a frontier guard in place strong enough to stop a hostile advance. No such force is in sight.

On 18 December, the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Allies completed a two-day conference at Brussels. It was unanimously agreed to expedite the formation of a Western European army to be under a Supreme Commander. President Truman was requested to make General Dwight D. Eisenhower available for this position. The President immediately did so, and authorized General Eisenhower to assume command over the U.S. Forces in Germany. The other NATO nations are individually to take the same action regarding their respective forces.

SOVIET UNION

IT IS well to know what a possible enemy estimates our strength and motives to be. Here are some extracts:

The Cominform's Advance CP at Peiping on 6 October in a broadcast agreed with American estimates that "the major decisive battlefield will be Europe." It then continued: "For this reason, before launching the great war, American imperialism must

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

first seek the arming of Japan, aggression against Korea, so that the war preparations in Asia may be completed before it can proceed with ease of mind with preparations in Europe." Russian and Chinese commentators expressed the opinion that the correct solution to this situation would be for the USSR to strike in Europe while the war continues in Asia.

Press articles, first noted on 1 November, and later expanded, allege that the strength of the United States is overestimated. After the withdrawal of Eighth Army, the U.S. forces were referred to as the paper tiger, easily defeated. The military position of the United States showed the following major defects according to the Communist press:

(1) Battle lines are too long (Baltic Sea to Trieste and to Korea).

(2) American forces are so far away from their bases, as to make supply and replacement extremely difficult.

(3) The United States lacks manpower (presumably in comparison with the Soviet Union) has low morale, and lacks battle experience. Both Germany and Japan have greater fighting power than the United States (This belief explains why Russia is so sensitive to rearming these two nations).

(4) U.S. allies are weak. None is useful. Britain, France and Italy are no longer military powers.

(5) "The United States has not yet a major base for offensive action either in the Far East or in West Europe."

Regarding U.S. superiority in industrial production, it was written that:

"It is true that the United States is superior in materials; steel, iron, coal and oil. This superiority is nullified by her military and other weak points—especially long transportation lines which will consume her oil. Because of transportation difficulties her supply of [raw] materials will become increasingly difficult.

"Moreover, the American superiority is only temporary. As soon as the United States starts World War III, West Europe will be quickly liberated. Then the ratio as to production between the two sides will change; American superiority will vanish. For example, after the liberation of West Europe the production of steel of the Soviet Union and its Democratic People's Democracies, plus that of West


Europe will exceed 67,000,000 tons per annum, as against 70,800,000 tons for the United States in 1948." [U.S. steel production is really around 100,000,000 tons per annum; to which might be added another 20,000,000 for the British Commonwealth.]

On 1 December, in East Berlin, the President of the Peoples Chamber, Johannes Dieckman, in a major speech, delivered in the presence of General Vassily I. Chuikov, Soviet CinC in East Germany, said: "The nations of the World Peace Camp stand, with all the power of their ideology behind the [Chinese] Volunteers in North Korea. They are not timid pacifists, and they will not remain dumb if the American guns are not silenced there." This statement should be compared with that of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on 2 October (reported on page 38 of the December issue of this magazine) that China "would not stand aside if North Korea were invaded." Chou En-lai's warning was ignored, but it meant what it said. The Berlin speech may also mean just what it says.

On 3 November, the Soviet Union complained to the three Western Powers regarding the decision of the North Atlantic Alliance to rearm Germany, saying it was a violation of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. It requested a conference of the Foreign Ministers to discuss this. This offer has been accepted by the Western Powers subject to the proposed conference also discussing other disputes between Russia and the West—Austria, Trieste, Korea, Formosa, and so on, with a preliminary conference of deputies to arrange an agenda. As this account closes, the Soviet press charged that the Western reply constituted evasive action — important point was rearmament of Germany which Russia would never tolerate. Another warning.

As the year 1950 came to an end, it found the world in a state of apprehension, with war threatening. Never before have preparations been so great, and never before have great preparations for war failed to lead to war. Under such conditions war may start from any incident, without its being desired by either side. This is a time of danger, and particularly so to the United States, which is confronted by an unscrupulous and strong power, and is aided by allies who, as the Soviets allege, are generally weak.

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TO THE EDITOR

Colonel Stimson

To the Editors:

On page 7 of the December number you had a fine tribute to a great American.

On my wall hang two commissions.

The first is as a "Second Lieutenant of Field Artillery," is dated 27 May 1912, and is signed "H. L. Stimson, Secretary of War."

The second is as a "Temporary Major General in the Army of the United States," is dated 12 April 1945 and is signed "Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War."

It is unusual, to say the least, for an American citizen to be honored with the office of Secretary of War in periods separated by thirty-two years.

MAJ. GEN. CLIFF ANDRUS
Deputy Commander
Headquarters Second Army
Fort George G. Meade, Md.

The Stubb Boys

To the Editors:

Captain Robert A. Scruton's "The Question" in the December issue was most stimulating and certainly calls for an answer.

Lieutenant Stubb is most familiar to me for I have met him many times when the going was especially tough. His brother, Sergeant Stubb, was just as much a blessing and a curse to those of us who had him in our companies.

I am afraid that it is too late to do anything about the Stubb boys of World War II. Probably they are out of the Army and pretty bitter about their last days of service.

Fortunately the Stubb family is a big one and always shows up when they are needed the most. In Korea the younger Stubbs are already at work. Right now they are worth their weight in gold to their regimental commander, but the good colonel is going to get more gray hairs from worrying about these brothers when the fighting is over.

I believe the Stubbs can be salvaged and that they are worth salvaging. An indoctrination course conducted by officers they can respect might do the trick. The important thing is to tie in everything you want a Stubb to do with its ultimate worth in combat. This course might take as long as a year and not all of the Stubbs would complete it success-

fully, but those that did would be worth the effort.

Now how about an article concerning the fate of Captain Doright, the finest officer the army ever had until the first time he was shot at?

CAPT. TERRENCE H. MCCORMICK
Inf.-USAR
2023 South Arlington Ave.
Los Angeles 18, Calif.

A Guardman's Thanks

To the Editors:

Just a note to express a Guardsman's thanks and commendation for printing "A Salute to the Citizen Soldier" in the December issue.

The message will do much for the morale of those men who saw service in many fine fighting outfits during World War II and who, since 1945, have remained in contact through the Guard.

Guardsmen will realize you were not compelled to print the article and will be more appreciate the fine service and tribute you have rendered them.

W. C. BLANCHETTE
Secretary to the Governor
Office of the Governor
Helena, Mont.

Patron Saint

To the Editors:

Referring to page 6 of the December 1950 number, "Protection from Thunder and Fire," in which we are informed that Infantrymen have no patron saint, I read in the *Infantry Journal* before World War I that the patron saint of foot soldiers was St. Maurice.

If the files of the *Infantry Journal* were indexed, a worthy project undoubtedly, you would find the reference indexed.

The *Infantry Journal* by whatever name you choose to call it, is still my favorite magazine.

COL. W. R. SCOTT
USA-Rtd.
1626 Argonne Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

• We have a very good index but the indexer overlooked the article Colonel Scott mentions. Indexers themselves need a patron saint to protect them from errors of omission and commission.

Right Picture, Wrong Regiment

To the Editors:

I was company commander of the 9th Infantry's Cannon Company until wounded in early September 1944, and behold! today, when I opened the December *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* to "Surprise, Opportunely Applied," by Robert H. Carlson, the picture showing the cannon in operation was of my own company and not that of the 38th Infantry. This picture was taken on 30 August 1944 of the 1st Section, 1st Platoon, Cannon Company, 9th Infantry, then in position near the Brest airfield.

The military staff here at Allen Military Academy (by the way, three-fourths of my staff are veterans of the 2d Division, World War II) offer our best wishes for the future success of *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. We rate it so high that many subjects are used in our lectures.

MAJ. KEITH ANGIN
Infantry

PMS&T

Allen Military Academy
Bryan, Texas

• Many official Army pictures of World War II do not identify units smaller than divisions. A rifle squad will be identified as from the "999th Infantry Division," for example, with no reference to regiment, battalion or company. So what is an editor to do? Actually, we don't think it makes a great deal of difference. We try to find pictures of units mentioned but they are not always available or are not identified. The Army is so standardized that a picture of almost any gun crew of an Infantry Cannon Company in Europe in 1944 would be suitable illustration.

Parent's Defense

To the Editors:

In your letters column of the December issue, you published a letter from Robert S. Mugavin criticizing the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* for not denouncing my book, *Hood: Cavalier General*.

Mr. Mugavin asserts that I have been guilty of "rank inaccuracies, obvious cribbing and failure to evaluate Hood's capabilities as a commanding general." He believes that the book "smells."

I will not argue on what kind of odor arises from *Hood*, but a certain pride of parenthood impels me to deny as coolly as possible Mr. Mugavin's other charges. Against his opinion I would balance that of the military historian, Fletcher Pratt, in his review in the *New York Times* of 20 November 1949, which reads in part, "His book gets a high place, not only among Civil War biographies but also among those which trace the development of a man. . . . One may also be grateful for some acute remarks on overall Confederate strategy and for a general fairness altogether rare among authors of specialized biographies." . . .

As to the charge of "cribbing" I must affirm that I stole nothing from any other writer or source beyond the material customarily and necessarily extracted from other works and duly credited.

Mr. Mugavin is entitled to his own opinion on whether I failed to "evaluate Hood's capabilities." I believe they were stated most clearly.

To remove the "smell" of Hood from Mr. Mugavin's shelves, if it has not already been destroyed or cast out, I will gladly refund his four dollars on receipt of his copy sent me express collect.

I think you are doing a fine job with the new JOURNAL.

RICHARD O'CONNOR

The Herald Express
Los Angeles 54, Calif.

A Poet's Reply

To the Editors:

In your columns, Murray B. Stephens complains that my poetry is unrhymed. Mr. Stephens is totally mistaken; he will see that my poems do rhyme, if he will only take the trouble to read them. But my rhymes are not end-rhymes; they occur at the front of certain accented syllables. I use "front-rhyme," or alliteration. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors first used this type of rhyme; they found it to be good rhyme indeed for war and the sea. Instances of front-rhyme are common in poets of England and America for a thousand years.

Fully a decade before I wrote *Words Into Steel* I found that end-rhyme of the type Mr. Stephens desires was hardly effective in poetry. The result, as in most Army poetry, was doggerel; the rhyme seemed forced; it created humorous effects, and unintentional humorous effects at that. Moreover, the use of this rhyme keeps the poet from saying what he wants to say; and it forces him into conventional patterns.

... But even though the poems displeased Mr. Stephens, my buddies of Company G and others of the 163d Infantry Regiment read and liked them; so did other members of the 41st Infantry Division; so did *Yank* and other periodicals. ... If Mr. Stephens reads my poems aloud and pronounces them in the tones that they call for, he will no longer have any complaint about them. But, like most people, Mr. Stephens probably reads a poem aloud as it was intended to be read.

What right has Mr. Stephens to call anyone lazy for not complying with his prejudice? I spent ten years developing a poetry technique with rhyme. To get material for this poetry, I volunteered at the age of thirty-three from a lazy base-section job in Theater Fiscal Office in Brisbane to serve as a rifleman. ... Ask my COs ... about my combat record ... ask Irv Sprague, my platoon leader. ... I believe that Mr. Stephens ought to say publicly that he withdraws [the

charge that I am lazy]; I demand an apology worthy of an officer and a gentleman.

HARGIS WESTERFIELD

East Central State College
Ada, Okla.

Command of Tactical Air

To the Editors:

"Who Should Command Tactical Air Forces?" is certainly a curiously reasoned argument when reduced to fundamentals. Colonel Kintner's argument really boils down to the proposition that air-ground cooperation was effective in the last war because air force generals were "psychologically subordinate" to ground force generals, and, since he believes that this condition is apparently going to change, steps should be taken to force the tactical air arm into a subordinate position. Everything else, he says, is just a prop to support this queer thesis. (It's too bad he can't give us an article with case histories of emotionally arrested air force generals, with specific examples of how they lost the "Battle of Brass.") I would like to advance the argument that if Colonel Kintner's view is to prevail that the ground forces should have no command of tactical aviation until such time as there is assurance that its leaders (i.e., those who might qualify to command tactical aviation) are thoroughly indoctrinated in the capabilities of aircraft and all the problems of the air force as related to tactical employment.

Unless this is done, there are going to be a lot of good airmen getting killed (and probably infantrymen, too) because of ignorance on the part of ground force commanders. May I cite a few cases in the last war where the ignorance of supposedly qualified generals was so abysmal in handling antiaircraft (which was a branch alien to their experience and thinking) that it was incredible to even the lowest yardbird in AA? This is merely typical, I believe, of the sort of unreasoned handling that airmen would get if tactical command were to pass from the air force without proper orientation of ground force commanders.

One general in Alaska ordered a 90mm battery detached from a battalion, and had the guns dotted around a harbor, in violation of all AA doctrine and, in effect, making the guns absolutely worthless in event they found it necessary to perform their mission. Again, a certain three-star general did not know, as late as July 1945, that AA was firing at night targets without the aid of searchlights—he thought the Navy was the only branch firing at unseen targets. In another case, a very prominent ground force general presumed to lead some visiting foreign generals through a display of AA equipment in early 1945 (note the date!) and announced, "This is our biggest and latest radar," as he pointed to the oldest and

most obsolete piece of equipment we had in AA at the time. Others could multiply the stories a hundred times over, and they are all indicative of the smug, watertight mind that seems to flourish when commanders presume to direct tactical employment of equipment with which they have no familiarity.

The pat argument which Colonel Kintner uses to brush away the tactical command structure in the last war requires a good deal of documentation before it can be accepted, and as it stands now it is a gratuitous insult to the able commanders of the air force. It seems to me that the JOURNAL could explore the reasons why cooperation cannot work, as alleged by the author, rather than just take a flat statement that such is the case. In view of the increasingly complex nature of the capabilities of operational aircraft and the natural tendency of morale to be high only when men are led by those who understand their job, it seems there is a lot more sense to seeing that "cooperation" is the guiding principle. Also, either purposely or unintentionally, the author blandly ignores existence of the fact that tactical operations may have strategic consequence, and *vice versa*, all of which make the subject much more complex than he has made it appear. Colonel Kintner's argument seems directed solely toward keeping a "command empire" in the ground forces.

CAPT. HOMER HILTON, JR.
USAFR

Drawer 178

Marquette, Mich.

• No; we think there are many commanders who know tactical air right now, and others can learn. What's so complex about the capabilities and limitations of tactical air units? Every ground commander should know them thoroughly, anyway.

Report from Pleasantville

To the Editors:

Our mail has been unusually heavy these past few months and we have fallen behind in acknowledging it. Please accept our apologies for the delay in reporting on your new magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL.

You have certainly done a good job of combining the Infantry and Field Artillery journals and are to be congratulated on such a fine achievement. Those of us here who have read the first issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL agree that it contains a good deal of interesting material. But, unhappily, we don't spot any article in our line which seems readily adaptable for condensation. We'll be sure to follow subsequent issues, however, with a view to reprint possibilities.

Meanwhile, many thanks for thinking of us.

THE EDITORS
READER'S DIGEST

Pleasantville, N. Y.

BOOK REVIEW

The Turning Point of the War

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Volume IV: THE HINGE OF FATE. By Winston S. Churchill. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1000 Pages; Index; \$6.00.

This is the fourth volume of Winston Churchill's uniquely important war memoirs. Coming to British leadership at the darkest hour of the Empire's history, on 10 June 1940, Churchill had promised his people nothing but "blood and toil, tears and sweat." The tale he unfolded in earlier volumes was one of almost unrelieved defeat and frustration: the loss of Poland, the blundering in Norway, the collapse of France, defeat in Greece and Crete. There were only a few bright pages in the long record of disaster: the miracle of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the rout of Graziani's army in Libya. The greatest relief afforded Britain in her isolated struggle for survival against the combined might of the Axis came at the hands of Churchill's opposite number in Germany, *Feldherr* Adolf Hitler. In 1941 this remarkably ignorant man invaded Russia and declared war on the United States. Thus Churchill could begin the present volume with the certainty that Britain could escape defeat. The Empire had two immensely powerful allies, yet for six months following Pearl Harbor there was no interruption in the chronicle of British disappointments.

Even before the defense of the home islands had been made secure, Churchill considered the Mediterranean area to be of highest strategic importance. He diverted troops and supplies to this area in 1940 which made the defeat of the Italian army in Libya possible. He organized the conquest of Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland and gave ineffective aid to Greece and Yugoslavia. When Rommel's appearance in North Africa vitalized the Axis menace in that area, Churchill reinforced the Empire's only striking force—the Eighth Army in the Western Desert. Consequently when Japan suddenly struck in the Far East, Britain had no defenses in that area worthy of the name. The key ships of her Far Eastern fleet, the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* were quickly sunk by the Japanese air force; the troops earmarked for the defense of Singapore were exhausted in an effort to defend all Malaya.

To Churchill's surprise, he found in January 1942 that Singapore had no fortifications defending it from an attack from

the land side. No member of his staff had ever called this fatal weakness to his attention. The improvised efforts to remedy this deficiency failed completely. The greatest capitulation in British history followed with grave political repercussions for Churchill. In retrospect Churchill feels that it would have been wise to have sent the Australian division which was lost in Singapore to Burma instead, but the sensitivity of the Australian government to any abandonment of Singapore deterred him. If any proof is required of the independence of members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, it can be found in the refusal of the Australian government to permit the use of its troops in Burma.

Churchill's critics in Parliament capitalized upon the disasters in the Far East to urge upon him a separation of the posts of Prime Minister and Defense Minister which he had filled since June 1940. He was able to survive all the Parliamentary challenges in 1942 and 1943 because no one could lay the responsibility for Britain's lack of military preparation on him, because the War Cabinet was completely loyal and because no serious division took place between Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff.

In his account of the loss of Burma, Churchill demonstrates an unwillingness to accept the American evaluation of Chinese forces. He was astonished to find that Roosevelt and some of his advisers reckoned the Chinese armies as a factor of equal importance in the war to the Red Army. Quotations from General Wavell's cables make it clear that the British did not "refuse" Chinese help in Burma as has so often been claimed, but that delays in getting Chinese troops into Burma came from Chungking. In contrast to other writers who find nothing good about the Burma campaign Churchill believes it saved India and gave valuable experience to General Alexander who "in stark defeat . . . showed all those qualities of military skill, imperturbability, and wise judgment that brought him later into the first rank of Allied war leaders."

Hard upon the heels of disaster in the Far East came a frightening intensification of German U-boat war in 1942. Churchill never lost sight of the fact that Britain might survive certain defeats in land campaigns, but it could not survive the cutting of her sea communications. Many months of heavy losses had to be endured until new methods of anti-submarine warfare reduced losses

to a level where Allied ship construction assured a margin of safety. One of the most valuable contributions that Churchill makes to an all-around history of the war is to focus the reader's intention on the vital aspect of sea communications in World War II. He also gives a brilliant account of the difficulties encountered in sending Allied aid to Russia by the northern convoy route.

What makes Churchill's personalized account of World War II of such surpassing value to the student of war and to the historian is the practice he follows of quoting from the actual documents and minutes which he wrote at the time. Thus we have the raw material of history woven into a fascinating pattern by one of the greatest living masters of the English language. Compared to Churchill's almost classic memoranda and minutes, the records of Hitler's conferences on military affairs seem shabby and erratic.

The crown of Churchill's sorrows came in June 1942 while he was in Washington for an Allied conference. He had spent a great deal of time and energy preparing the British Eighth Army to defeat Rommel. Though he distrusted Auchinleck's practice of leaving direction of the army to General Ritchie, he was confident that the impending offensive of the Eighth Army would deal the Afrika Korps a heavy blow. Instead Rommel took the offensive, cut up the Eighth Army at Knightsbridge ridge and recaptured Tobruk with about 33,000 prisoners. In this dark hour Roosevelt and General Marshall stripped one of our best armored divisions of its tanks and self-propelled guns and sent them to Egypt. Churchill appreciated to the full this singular act of generosity.

The minutes and notes in this volume make it plain that Churchill did not see eye to eye with his military leaders and advisors at all times. He had little patience with their complaints about the short-comings of British tanks and weapons because he could often see little evidence that the military had used them to the best advantage. He constantly balanced Axis difficulties against difficulties advanced by his own commanders. When General Ismay, watching the training of American troops in 1942, said that it would be "murder" to put these troops against Continental forces, Churchill contradicted him.

Churchill gives no new material on the Battle of El Alamein but focuses attention on Alexander as the leader primarily responsible for the victory. Ironically enough, shortly before the tide of war turned in the autumn of 1942, Churchill had to meet severe criticism for his handling of generals and his conduct of the war. Sir Stafford Cripps was convinced that unless Churchill changed his methods disaster would follow. What followed was El Alamein, Torch, and Stalingrad.

Those military writers who have asserted that Churchill did not share Roosevelt's weakness for supporting the Russians will get little comfort from this volume. Neither will those who claimed that Churchill wshed on his promise of a second front in Europe in 1942. For their benefit he quotes the *aide memoire* which was handed to Molotov in 1942. It contained the words: "We can therefore give no promises in the matter, but provided it appears sound and sensible we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect." The Soviet leaders, including Stalin, conveniently forgot this sentence.

Given Roosevelt's determination to get American ground forces into action in some European theater in 1942 and the American planners' failure to come up with a reasonable project for employing them in a cross-Channel operation in 1942, Torch was Roosevelt's and Churchill's alternative. Churchill makes it clear that no program for invading the Balkans was contemplated by the British in 1942 and 1943.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters in this volume are those devoted to Churchill's visit to Stalin in August 1942. Somebody had to tell the Russians that a cross-Channel operation could not be mounted in 1942. Up to this time no personal contact had been established between Stalin and the leaders of the West. For Churchill it was a strange mission. He had opposed the Bolshevik regime in the early days. He held Stalin's cynical pact with Hitler in 1939 to have been a stupid mistake. The second front for which the Russians were screaming in 1941-42 had been effectively undermined by Stalin in 1939-40. Yet the Red armies were killing Germans on a grand scale in 1942, and it was necessary to create some measure of inter-allied cooperation. He was entertained with typical Russian lavishness and with the standard Kremlin routine of graciousness followed by brutal treatment. In the end he seemed to have convinced Stalin of the necessity for and the strategic promise of Torch. He was impressed with the quickness with which Stalin grasped essential features of a military plan on which the Allied planners had devoted months of effort but which Stalin heard described in a few words for the first time. One of the interesting footnotes to history is to be found in Stalin's remark to Churchill that the struggle against the *kulaks* in the farm collectivization program was worse than the strain of fighting the Germans.

On the controversial Darlan deal in North Africa, Churchill supports the point of view taken by Generals Eisenhower and Clark. He was happy to turn over the major responsibility for the North Africa campaign to the Americans, although he correctly points out that the major forces employed in Tunisia were British. He did not share Roosevelt's consistent distrust of DeGaulle. As for the

OFF-DUTY READING

WYLIE, MENCKEN, BOSWELL & THE A-BOMB

PHILIP Wylie, who for many years has been busily dissecting our admittedly fiddle-witted 20th Century civilization, may now have come to his peroration. Titled *The Disappearance* (Rinehart, \$3.50) it deals with a world in which men and women have disappeared from each other at the same instant.

Having begun with a magnificent act of imagination, Wylie goes on from there to describe the four years of the disappearance in the man's and in the woman's world—plague, pestilence, famine, war, bewildered people trying desperately to bring order from chaos, occasional comedy, mostly desperate loneliness.

Wylie's point—that we are one with each other and with God; that the sense of separateness of the sexes is dangerous madness; that through honest, shared love we may yet get out of the mess we are in.

All this, told with Wylie's magnificent craftsmanship, makes wonderful reading and reveals in its author a deep sense of compassion that has not been evident in much of his other work.

I SHALL now preach a sermon. A month or two ago Combat Forces Book Service sent out a circular on *The Effects of Atomic Weapons* (\$5). One customer didn't buy the book, but sent in a pleasant note in this vein: "I appreciate very much your letting me know about this book, but I am now seventy-two years old and am no longer greatly concerned with such things."

Which is a fine philosophy to live by if you happen to be seventy-two years old. Unhappily some millions of people way on the sunny side of four score and twelve years seem to feel the same way. I can only point out—as my betters have already done—that there are many things you can do to save yourself from an A-bomb and that it would be a fine idea if you knew what they were. Many a soldier of World War II has lived to be a veteran by digging innumerable holes just in case somebody might drop a shell nearby.

But back to pleasant thoughts and pleasanter times. *Disturber of the Peace* (Harper, \$3.75) might be about Philip Wylie, but is instead a biography—and a very good one—of Henry Louis Mencken. I am afraid that Mencken is now chiefly remembered for his *American Language*, and as a rather ditty old gentleman who was convinced World War II "would never go beyond the making of faces."

Mencken certainly deserves immortality for the *American Language*, for it is the definitive work on our tongue, but he also needs remembering as one of our great literary critics and editors—as an elemental force in the literary revolt against "goodness" in the 20s.

While it is true that Mencken has lived to become an anachronism, we could use another like him—a great, energetic, and unabashed individualist. William Manchester has done a considerable service in putting Mr. Mencken in his proper perspective for our generation.

[NOTE: Now that William Faulkner has won the Nobel Prize for Literature, those of you who might want to examine his work for the first time will find much of it in Modern Library editions.]

Boswell's London Journal, 1762-1763 (McGraw-Hill, \$5) is having tremendous and deserved success. Borrowed a copy, there being none around the office, and enjoyed it immensely. This, of course, is only a small part of the *Journal* (other volumes will be published later) but it is enough to reveal Boswell—immortal as Dr. Johnson's biographer—as one of the keenest and most irreverent students of humanity we have ever had.

The late Will Cuppy, a gentle humorist with a profound interest in all manner of things of no consequence at all, was almost the last of the rare breed of man who could show us how silly we are without hurting anybody's feelings. Fortunately his last book, *The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody* (Holt, \$3.00) is alive and doing nicely. The title is self-explanatory. O. C. S.

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much-disputed unconditional surrender policy widely attributed to Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference, Churchill in consulting his wartime records found that he had been fully informed of the proposal and had telegraphed the substance of the agreement to the War Cabinet. The only comment they made was to suggest leaving Italy out of the announcement. Churchill admits that he made several erroneous statements about the unconditional surrender matter relying on his memory. He quotes the advice of an old professor whose students had come to his bedside for a final word of counsel. What the old man said was simply: "Verify your quotations!"

This volume ends with plans for invading Italy. By the summer of 1943 the hinge of fate had turned. One hundred and twenty pages of appendices contain excerpts from Churchill's wartime documents. These show that his mind ranged the whole field of war from the matter of obtaining silk for the Victoria Cross to making an airfield on an iceberg. As sources of information on World War II and as examples of brilliant historical writings, these volumes are in a class by themselves.—H. A. DEWEERD.

Imposing and Impersonal

LIFE'S PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II. By the Editors of *Life*. Time, Inc., 368 pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00 regular edition; \$12.00 de luxe edition.

The title of this book is more imposing than it is accurate. Not even the editors of *Life* could get a picture history of World War II between the covers of a book, and, wisely, they have not attempted to.

What we actually have here is a quick run-through of the major phases of World War II, beginning with the conquest of Europe and ending with the official capitulation of Japan aboard the *Missouri*.

With each major division of the book, John Dos Passos has written a thousand-or-so word capsule of that phase of the war. These, though so brief as to be skeletal, show Mr. Dos Passos to have both knowledge and deep understanding of the vast complex that was World War II. Robert Sherrod, who made the Marines' war in the Pacific his own, has written most of the running commentary accompanying the pictures. He succeeds in telling clearly not only what each set of pictures means in itself, but also how it is generally representative of a phase of the war.

In fact, Messrs. Dos Passos and Sherrod have done better for themselves than the editors who selected the photographs and paintings for their volume. The selection is competent enough, but it seems to me that it is on such a level that it will find little response among the men who fought World War II. On these pages is a panorama of World

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War II, but it is a panorama of imper-sonalities. Only occasionally can a man feel from these pictures the immense and terrifying loneliness of the men who carried the battle forward on foot, and in the machines of war.

The shots that do seem to have the feeling of this particular reality are German and Russian photographs of the Eastern Front, mostly showing men and machines moving against an almost limitless emptiness. One gets from these pages the feeling that most soldiers had at one time or another—that they were going to spend the rest of their lives, if they lived that long—going on and on toward a horizon that never got any nearer, whether the horizon was the next hill, the next island, or the next city to be bombed.

In short, if you want to get a quick roundup of World War II, this is your book. If you want to study World War II, this is a good place to start. If you want the feel of World War II, it isn't here—O. C. S.

History to Feel and Enjoy

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. Vol. VI: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-1944. By Captain Samuel Eliot Morison. Atlantic-Little, Brown & Company. 463 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$6.00.

The Bismarcks barrier lay between New Guinea and the Solomons, made up of such stout posts as Kavieng on New Ireland; the Admiralty Islands; Wewak, Madang, Lae, Salamaua and Buna on New Guinea; Cape Gloucester, Gasmata and Rabaul on New Britain. Of all posts that supported this barrier Rabaul was the most powerful and the most important. It prevented MacArthur's advance along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis and it confined Halsey's South Pacific Force to the lower Solomons.

From Rabaul's five airfields came the deadly swarms that pounded sea and ground forces. From Rabaul's protected harbor darted the deadly naval forces that harassed the Allies. Rabaul was the king post of the Bismarcks barrier. Breaking it called for difficult and complicated operations which ran from August 1942 to May 1944. These operations included, as Captain Morison puts it, "every sort of fighting that occurred anywhere in World War II: naval battles such as Kula Gulf, Kolombangara, Vella Gulf, Empress Augusta Bay and Cape St. George; land fighting in the equatorial jungle at Buna, Cape Gloucester, Munda and the Bougainville Perimeter; strategic bombing; air-surface actions, including the Battle of the Bismarck Sea; almost daily air vs ship, air vs ground troops and air vs air actions; brief but bloody brawls between barges and motor torpedo boats; and some of the most important amphibious operations in the Pacific War."

"In the spirit of unification," Captain

Morison does not confine his accounts to naval actions alone, but gives generous treatment to the parts played by the air and ground forces. Going further, he stresses that these were not only joint operations, but that they were combined, and included sizable elements of ground, sea and air forces from Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands.

This is the sixth in a projected fourteen-volume series. This reviewer has only one complaint to make of this book and the others he has been privileged to read: and that is that he can find no complaint with them. There has been no drop in the narrative-power, no hint of weakening in Morison's masterful grasp of detail and his ability to present the big picture, no dimming of his critical eye, no lessening in his analytical presentations. Here, by the grace of Morison, is history you can feel as you read, that you can enjoy as you read, and that, willy-nilly, will teach you something as you read.—R. G. McC.

Hitler's Own Record

HITLER DIRECTS HIS WAR. Conferences translated and edited by Felix Gilbert. Oxford University Press. 220 Pages; Index; \$3.25.

Despite the millions of words written about him before and since his death, Hitler as a military leader has remained something of an enigma. His generals have supplied a great mass of information (most of it unflattering), but none of those who know him well could be trusted to give an objective analysis. For lurking in the background is the responsibility for losing Germany's war, and the professional soldiers have not hesitated to blame their nonprofessional leader.


But now Hitler offers evidence in his own behalf and in his own words. Thanks largely to the initiative of an American intelligence sergeant, a small but significant part of the 200,000 pages of transcript of Hitler's conferences with his military chiefs was recovered. Out of the fire pit where the entire record was thrown, the Americans reclaimed some 800 pages of typescript and shorthand notes which, fragmentary and badly damaged as they were, provided a valuable insight into Hitler's conduct of the war.

Hitler Directs His War is a collection of only thirteen of the conferences he held twice daily between 1 December 1942 and 23 March 1945. Some are quite incomplete, but thousands of Hitler's own impromptu words, in context with those of his top military and political leaders, shed ample light on his philosophy, personality, bold self-confidence and sometimes startling military acuity. Editing and annotation by Mr. Gilbert give the series remarkable clarity and link each conference with the actual event of the time. Four of the conferences deal with the North Africa and Stalingrad operations, five with the Italian

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crisis and one with the consequence of the Teheran meeting. The others cover the Soviet winter offensive of 1943, the attempt of July 1944 on Hitler's life and the final operations of the war. In addition there is the text of a speech Hitler delivered to his generals in December 1944.

Except for the speech, which apparently was a prepared pep talk, all the quotes from Hitler given here reveal the man as his natural self. To those who visualize a rug-chewing madman, some of Hitler's calm reasoning behind his decisions might come as a surprise. But his emotionalism, frequent repetition and digression and obsession with suicide give clear evidence of his psychotic state. The vulgar Hitler German is approximated in translation by slang which serves to contrast his speech with that of his officers.

The analytical introduction by the editor points out that the record supports an early estimate by Colonel General Halder that Hitler's "gift for technical detail and for over-all strategy were remarkable, but that he lacked the capacity of operational thinking" needed for a practical combination of the two factors.

Especially after the attempt on his life, Hitler obviously had little faith in his generals. Every suggestion of withdrawal aroused his suspicion of motives. When Generals Paulus, Seydlitz and Schmidt were captured at Stalingrad, he immediately predicted they would broadcast for the Reds "within a week." Actually he was mistaken only on the time; it was two months.

The record even offers some comedy relief, as Hitler and Goering try to decide what to do with retired officers called up in the Volkssturm. Goering cited the case of a former general called up in rank as a company commander—the only job he could be trusted with—under a junior battalion commander. The situation was symptomatic of the time, but the end was near and a solution hardly mattered.

Behind this valuable book is a story of the initiative of Technical Sergeant George Allen. Allen heard about the presence of two of Hitler's official stenographers as soon as he moved into Berchtesgaden with the 506th Parachute Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division on 5 May 1945. Between his other work in the division's counterintelligence office, he interviewed these men and learned by chance that the last of the three transcripts of the military conferences had been burned near town.

Allen and Special CIC Agent Eric Albrecht, assigned to work with him, decided then to break the rules. Instead of sending the Germans to a CIC internment camp as was SOP, they took them out to search for the ashes. There they found the 800 remaining pages, most of them in poor condition.

If what remained of the record was to be preserved, Allen knew quick action was necessary. So he and Albrecht round-

ed up the stenographic and typing staff which had prepared the typewritten and put it to work. Typewriters were requisitioned, paper bought, food seized from Werewolf supplies, and quarters arranged to give the workers every incentive to do a good job. Within a month after it had been working for Hitler, the staff under Der Führer's chief stenographer was working for the United States Army.

As a result, those who made the original record were able to correlate the pages and even reconstruct missing sections of the transcript, being careful to indicate where they had done so.—Brooks McClure.

How It Began

THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR. By Herbert Feis. Princeton University Press. 356 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

The onus for the disgrace of being caught asleep at Pearl Harbor will probably never be pinned down to the satisfaction of everyone. Partisan accounts there have been aplenty, and this one is a probing narrative which is refreshing and useful.

The tragedy is that a concerted effort could probably have averted war, but when the United States was ready to move, Britain was not. And when Britain prodded, we lagged. When the Soviet flirled, we turned a cold cheek. When the Germans made overtures, other matters occupied the democratic powers. The slow, creeping paralysis that overcame the world as it watched the inevitable war approach is well reflected in this dispassionate analysis.

Mr. Feis's study is full and impartial, and he seems to have had available records and information of an exceptional range. The narrative follows events in a double mirror of which one side is Washington and the other Tokyo, both catching reflections from the other powers of the world. The book contains a close study of the ways in which officials, diplomats and soldiers think and act; of the environment of decision, of the ambitions of nations, of the clash of their ideas, of the ways in which fear and mistrust effect events, and of the struggle for time and advantage.—R. G. McC.

Briefly Noted

AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSIONS SIMPLIFIED. By Jud Purvis. Goodheart-Willcox Company. 264 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. Answering the questions of new car buyers and those who like to do their own mechanical work.

HOW TO HELP YOUR CHILD IN SCHOOL. By Mary & Lawrence K. Frank. The Viking Press. 368 Pages; Index; \$2.95.

JANE MECOM. By Carl Van Doren. The Viking Press. 255 Pages; Index; \$4.00. A biography of Benjamin Franklin's favorite sister.

THE SMITHSONIAN: AMERICA'S TREASURE HOUSE. By Webster Prentiss True. Sheridan House. 306 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50.

THE PAGEANT OF RUSSIAN HISTORY. By Elizabeth Seeger. Longmans, Greene & Company. 433 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50.

THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS. By Norbert Wiener. Houghton Mifflin Company. 241 Pages; Index; \$3.00.

WHY WAR CAME IN KOREA. By Robert T. Oliver. Fordham University Press. 260 Pages; \$2.95.

RUN, MONGOOSE. By Burke Wilkinson. Little, Brown & Company. 309 Pages; \$3.00.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1949. By Richard P. Stebbins. Harper & Brothers. 574 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

COMMUNICATION WITHIN INDUSTRY: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE INTERCHANGE. By Raymond W. Peters. Harper & Brothers. 198 Pages; Index; \$3.00.

SECURITY, LOYALTY AND SCIENCE. By Walter Gellhorn. Cornell University Press. 300 Pages; Index; \$3.00. A plea for less secrecy in scientific research.

WATCH FOR THE MORNING: THE STORY OF PALESTINE'S JEWISH PIONEERS AND THEIR BATTLE FOR THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL. By Thomas Sugrue. Harper & Brothers. 304 Pages; \$3.50.

BERNARD BARUCH: PORTRAIT OF A CITIZEN. By W. L. White. Harcourt, Brace & Company. 158 Pages; \$2.00.

PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY OWMR: THE OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION. By Herman Miles Somers. Harvard University Press. 238 Pages; Index; \$4.50.

THE LIFE OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By Louis Fischer. Harper & Brothers. 558 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

THE PUERTO RICAN JOURNEY: NEW YORK'S NEWEST MIGRANTS. By C. Wright Mills, Clarence Senior and Rose Kohn Goldsen. Harpen & Brothers. 238 Pages; Index; \$3.00. A report on how the Puerto Ricans are reacting to life in New York City.

THIS IS WEST POINT. By Lewis Herman. Abelard Press Inc. 137 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75. A picture story.

MY HEART REMEMBERS. By William Addleman Ganoe. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 245 Pages; \$3.00. The story about a Methodist parish in Pennsylvania in the 1880s by the author of *History of the United States Army and Soldiers Unmasked*.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE. By J. C. Hurewitz. W. W. Norton & Company. 404 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00.

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
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